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WHEN CONGRESS PASSES AN
INTENTIONALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
ACT OF 2006
Paul A. Diller*
When Congress passes a law with the intent that it be invalidated or sub-
stantially altered by the courts- "intentionally unconstitutional" legisla-
tion-Congress abdicates its role as a co-equal interpreter of the
Constitution. Intentionally unconstitutional legislation is particularly prob-
lematic in the national-security context, in which the Supreme Court has
traditionally relied upon Congress to assist it in defining the limits of execu-
tive power. This Article argues that Section 7 of the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, which attempted to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear habeas petitions by alien enemy combatants held at Guantdnamo and
other foreign sites, was intentionally unconstitutional legislation because
some key legislators supported or facilitated the Act's passage while simul-
taneously arguing that Section 7 violated the Constitution. The Supreme
Court's invalidation of the MCA's Section 7 in Boumediene v. Bush was,
therefore, largely consistent with Congress' intent and not the "activist" de-
cision its critics have decried. On the other hand, by allowing members of
Congress to expressly violate their oaths to support and defend the Consti-
tution, the Court's decision in Boumediene only reduces the incentive for
members of Congress to take political risks to defend constitutional princi-
ples in the future. The story of the MCA's passage and the Court's decision
in Boumediene further demonstrate that Congress does not now just toler-
ate-but depends upon-the Supreme Court to assert itself as the exclusive
interpreter of constitutional principles, at least in the national-security
context.
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INTRODUCTION
IKE justices of the Supreme Court and the President, members ofLCongress swear an oath to uphold the Constitution.' Particularly
in times of war, the constitutional design has traditionally de-
pended upon members fulfilling their oaths when enacting legislation that
affects the separation of powers. Under the approach famously articu-
lated by Justice Robert Jackson in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure case), 2 the Supreme Court relies on
Congress to provide it with a credible signal regarding how much execu-
tive power the political process endorses. The Court, using its own inter-
pretive techniques, then makes an independent decision regarding
executive power that relies on Congress' informed judgment.3 Through-
out, the Steel-Seizure model assumes that Congress intends for its legisla-
tion to survive judicial review relatively unscathed.
Congress' passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006-particu-
larly, its habeas-stripping Section 7-and the Supreme Court's recent in-
validation of Section 7 in Boumediene v. Bush4 represent a significant
departure from the Steel-Seizure model. In purporting to strip habeas
through the MCA's Section 7, this Article argues, Congress enacted a law
that it wanted to see judicially invalidated, or at least substantially al-
tered, by the courts. In doing so, Congress passed to the Court the sole
responsibility for restraining the executive and deprived the Court of
Congress' politically informed estimate as to how much executive power
the Constitution permits.
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (oath of office administered to elected or appointed
officials other than the president).
2. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT 215,
229, 233 (2002).
4. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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The MCA, passed in September 2006 in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,5 sought to establish a congres-
sionally sanctioned system for detaining and trying foreign terrorist sus-
pects. As this Article will explain, some key congressmen voted for the
MCA while simultaneously arguing that its habeas-stripping Section 7
was unconstitutional. Like Senator Arlen Specter, the Pennsylvania Re-
publican and Judiciary Committee chair who voted for the MCA while at
the same time denouncing its habeas-stripping provision as "patently un-
constitutional," 6 many members of Congress who voted for or otherwise
facilitated passage of the MCA likely did so with the intent that, as Sena-
tor Specter said, the courts would "clean it up."' 7
In the end, Congress got what it wanted when a five-justice majority in
Boumediene opted for a wholesale, rather than partial, "cleanup" of Sec-
tion 7 of the MCA. The majority invalidated Section 7 outright rather
than aggressively interpret it to render it constitutional, as Chief Justice
Roberts urged in his dissent. Thus, Boumediene may have been an exer-
cise in "judicial supremacy," as Justice Scalia charged in his dissent,8 but
it was not inconsistent with legislative intent. In the process of Congress
getting its hoped-for judicial cleanup and the Court accepting this aggran-
dizing role, the actions of both institutions imperiled Steel Seizure's dy-
namic, three-branch model of constitutional interpretation.
Congress' passage of the MCA and Boumediene's subsequent
"cleanup" did not occur in a jurisprudential vacuum. Rather, as this Arti-
cle will explain, the Court has for the last twenty or so years increasingly
arrogated to itself the role of sole constitutional interpreter, essentially
rendering meaningless the presumption of constitutionality for federal
laws, a doctrine that is supposed to demonstrate the Court's respect for
Congress as a co-equal constitutional interpreter. 9 Moreover, through its
use of the "canon of avoidance," another doctrine that is supposed to
demonstrate judicial respect for Congress's interpretive role, the Court
has actually increased congressional dependence on aggressive judicial
review. Thus, when the Court in Hamdan uncharacteristically attempted
to "force democracy" by seemingly inviting the legislative branch to join
it in crafting a constitutional system for detaining and trying terrorist sus-
pects, it encountered a legislative branch unable and unwilling to engage
seriously in upholding constitutional values. 10 Rather, contrary to what
most scholars generally assume,11 Congress responded to Hamdan by en-
5. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
6. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
7. Daniel Michael, The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
473, 479 (2007).
8. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302.
9. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991).
10. Posting of Jack M. Balkin to http://balkin.blogspot.com2006/06/hamdan-as-democ-
racy-forcing-decision.html (June 29, 2006, 13:07 EST).
11. E.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575,
1607 (2001) ("[I]I is safe to assume that government policymakers prefer, whenever possi-
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acting a law that it wanted to see invalidated or substantially changed by
the courts. In passing the MCA, Congress demonstrated that it does not
just tolerate, but depends upon, the Court to be the primary, if not exclu-
sive, interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, at least in the national-
security context.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will explain how the con-
stitutional design envisions a strong role for Congress to play in constitu-
tional interpretation. It will discuss the manner in which the Supreme
Court of the last twenty years, however, has generally denigrated this
role. Specifically, it will explore the manner in which the very doctrines
that purport to show a respect for congressional constitutional interpreta-
tion-the presumption of constitutionality and the canon of avoidance-
have either been rendered meaningless or have subverted the values they
purport to serve. Part II will explain why members of Congress might
vote for, or otherwise facilitate the passage of, legislation they want to be
invalidated as unconstitutional, and deals with the tricky question of con-
gressional intent in such circumstances. Part III analyzes the passage of
the MCA and explains why its habeas-stripping provision was intention-
ally unconstitutional. Part IV analyzes the Court's decision in
Boumediene, and argues that, by invalidating Section 7 of the MCA, the
Court largely followed legislative intent. At the same time, however, the
Court's decision arrogates ever more power over constitutional interpre-
tation to the judiciary, further weakening the incentive for Congress to
police constitutional boundaries on its own.
I. CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AND (SUPPOSED) JUDICIAL DEFERENCE THERETO
Written in broad prose rather than wordy specificity, the Constitution
lends itself to a multitude of interpretations. It is less a series of fixed
commands than an "invitation to struggle" among the branches of gov-
ernment that it establishes. 12 Although there is a broad consensus among
legal practitioners and academics that Marbury v. Madison established
the judiciary as the final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning, 13 the legis-
lative and executive branches of government have historically played
large roles in constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court has ex-
ble, to steer wide of constitutional danger areas."); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revis-
ited, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 71, 82 ("Congress certainly has a desire, we can assume, not to
have its statutes declared unconstitutional."); but see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Seri-
ous Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free
Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 22 (1996) (arguing that it is "questionable"
whether "Congress understands the Court's constitutional precedents and tries to legislate
within the[ir] boundaries").
12. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787-1957 171 (4th
rev. ed. 1957).
13. 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)
(Marbury declared it "basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution.").
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plicitly stated that constitutional issues in the category of "political ques-
tions" are for the executive and/or legislature to decide, not for the
judiciary. 14 Even when deciding justiciable matters, the Court has often
looked to the other branches for assistance in constitutional interpreta-
tion, resulting in a "deeply collaborative" process of constitutional inter-
pretation. 15 While some scholars have challenged the Supreme Court's
claim to ultimate authority to decide most constitutional matters, 16 one
need not go that far to recognize that the constitutional design necessarily
gives Congress an important role to play in constitutional interpretation.
In one sense, Congress has always had more power over the Constitu-
tion's meaning than the judiciary: it can begin the process of amending
the Constitution's text rather than merely interpreting the existing text.' 7
Although the amendment process provides the clearest method for Con-
gress to register its dissatisfaction with judicial interpretations of the Con-
stitution, it has seldom been used in American history, in part because of
its supermajority requirements and the need for ratification by three-
quarters of the states. 18 Nonetheless, even failed constitutional amend-
ments have influenced the direction of judicial constitutional interpreta-
tion by showing the Supreme Court that Americans feel strongly about a
particular constitutional subject (albeit perhaps not strongly enough to
pass an amendment), and thus pushing at least some of the more politi-
cally sensitive members of the Court to chart a new interpretive course. 19
Besides the amendment process, Congress has a number of other tools
at its disposal to influence constitutional interpretation by the judiciary.
The Constitution provides that federal judges shall be appointed by the
president with the "advice and consent" of the Senate.20 Senators have
used their "advice and consent" role to influence significantly the direc-
tion of constitutional jurisprudence. In addition to the obvious power of
confirming or denying nominees, senators have played a behind-the-
scenes role in the selection of federal judges by signaling to the president
whether particular types of nominees are likely to be confirmed.2 ' More-
over, confirmation hearings allow senators to voice their views on consti-
tutional issues, views that the sitting members of the Supreme Court may
take into account in future cases. 22 In addition to the Senate's confirma-
tion powers, Congress can significantly influence the judicial branch
14. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
15. Coenen, supra note 11, at 1590.
16. See generally, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 83 GEO.
L.J. 217 (1994).
17. U.S. CONST. art. V.
18. Id.
19. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, What's So great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 145, 161-62 (1998); Jamie Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia and the
Right to Vote, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 85 (1999).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
21. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE Arnr-
TUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 222 (2002).




through its authority to establish and fund a system of federal courts; leg-
islate regarding jurisdiction; prescribe rules of decision, procedure, and
evidence; and impeach judges.2 3 Although out of respect for judicial in-
dependence Congress has generally abstained from using impeachment,
funding cuts, and the more egregious forms of jurisdiction-stripping to
influence constitutional law,24 they remain powers that are formally avail-
able to a Congress dissatisfied with the Court's constitutional
pronouncements. 25
In addition to influencing the judiciary's interpretations of the Consti-
tution, Congress interprets the document itself when it enacts laws. 26 As
compared to the executive, who has the power to veto proposed laws and
exercise discretion in enforcing those which have been passed, and the
judiciary, which can invalidate and interpret laws, the Constitution rests
the affirmative power to make law most clearly with Congress. 27 The
Framers understood that Congress, through its positive, lawmaking
power, would play at least a critical, if not determinative, role in defining
the Constitutional's meaning over time.2 8 Congress has used this power
throughout American history to flesh out the bare bones of the Constitu-
tion's text in a myriad of ways, each of which establishes a baseline to
which judicial review must later react, if it reacts at all. As Professor
Michael Stokes Paulsen has explained, "every legislative enactment by
Congress is, in a sense, an act of constitutional interpretation-an implicit
assertion by Congress that it has constitutional power to do what it is
doing. '29 To that end, the Framers and other leaders in early American
history expected that Congress, consistent with its members' oaths, would
police constitutional boundaries on its own when enacting legislation.30
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993); see
also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706,
2728-29 (2003).
24. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks on Judicial Independence, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1-5
(2006).
25. James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1205 (2006); Paulsen, supra note 23, at 2728-29.
26. See Francis Sejerstad, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in CONSTrruTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 142 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
27. To be sure, these roles have evolved and blurred greatly since the founding. The
judiciary sometimes "makes law," such as when it pronounces broad new rights from rela-
tively scant constitutional text, David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1996), as does the executive branch, particularly when it
exercises delegated lawmaking authority in the modern administrative state. Nick Smith,
Restoration of Congressional Authority and Responsibility over the Regulatory Process, 33
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 232 (1996).
28. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1994). Indeed, legislative dominance in
constitutional interpretation was a natural reference point for the Framers given their
background in the British legal system, which vested in Parliament the supreme authority
to interpret Britain's unwritten constitution. THOMAS B. McAFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS,
THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS' UNDER-
STANDING 126-27 (2000).
29. Paulsen, supra note 23, at 2731.
30. For instance, James Madison, as a member of the inaugural House of Representa-
tives, called on his colleagues to exercise their "incontrovertib[e]" " duty" to preserve the
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Congress' affirmative lawmaking power gives it more than just the abil-
ity to flesh out the constitutional skeleton in the absence of judicial pro-
nouncement. Congress may also use its lawmaking power to challenge
judicial constitutional interpretations by enacting statutes consistent with
Congress' constitutional views but arguably inconsistent with then-cur-
rent Supreme Court doctrine. In passing such statutes, Congress may
hope that the statutes will either evade judicial review or, when finally
reviewed, be met by a more receptive Supreme Court, whether because
the Court's composition might have changed or because members of the
Court, perhaps sensitive to political pressures, might have had a change
of constitutional heart. Such statutes are not "intentionally unconstitu-
tional," as I use that term in this Article, because Congress wants the
judiciary to uphold them, even if the chances of that occurring are slim.
Prominent instances of Congress successfully passing laws to challenge
Supreme Court precedent include some of the New Deal legislation that
the Court eventually upheld,3 1 and, more recently, Congress banning the
so-called "partial-birth" abortion procedure in 2003 in direct defiance of
a Supreme Court decision invalidating a nearly identical state law in
2000.32 The congressional ban reflected popular opinion strongly in favor
of restricting "partial-birth" abortion, 33 despite the Court's precedent
from 2000. In 2007, after the composition of the Court changed from
when it last considered the matter, the Court upheld Congress's ban,
weakly distinguishing its decision in the virtually identical case from
2000.
34
The idea that Congress has some legitimate role to play in constitu-
tional interpretation is not without its critics. Some commentators have
focused on the frequency with which Congress passes laws that contradict
then-existing Supreme Court precedent and have used this fact to argue
Constitution in its "entire," even on matters that did not directly affect Congress. See 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 482 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). President Andrew Jackson, in explaining
his disagreement with the Supreme Court's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), which upheld the creation of a national bank, proclaimed that "[i]t is
as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate ... to decide upon the
constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or
approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial
decision." Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (1832), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139 (James D. Richardson, III ed., 2d ed.
1911).
31. E.g., Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court Decisions, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1023 (2007) (discussing how "Four Horsemen" during Great
Depression blocked programs aimed at economic recovery despite popular support
thereof).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
33. Kenneth L. Woodward, What's in a Name? The New York Times on "Partial-
Birth" Abortion, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. Emlics & PUB. POL'Y 427, 433 n.13 (2005) (citing
Gallup polls showing that "a majority of Americans support a ban on 'partial-birth'
abortions").
34. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007); see also id. at 1643 n.4 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) ("The Act's sponsors left no doubt that their intention was to nullify
our ruling in Stenberg."); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitution-
alism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 386-87 (2007).
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that Congress is ill-suited to make constitutional judgments.35 This cri-
tique, however, assumes that Congress should be legislating in a manner
consistent with Supreme Court rulings, and implicitly assumes that the
Court is always right in its interpretations of the Constitution. That the
Court's constitutional interpretations are always right is a proposition
that even some justices have recognized to be of dubious validity. 36
Moreover, even if Cooper v. Aaron cemented the federal judiciary's "su-
preme" and final authority to expound upon the meaning of the Constitu-
tion's text,37 the constitutional structure, as explained above, clearly
allocates to Congress an important role in influencing how the judiciary
exercises this power.
The more compelling critique of congressional constitutional interpre-
tation is that Congress is institutionally incapable of making good consti-
tutional judgments, and should therefore refrain from engaging in
constitutional interpretation altogether. Abner Mikva, for instance, writ-
ing from the unique perspective of having been both a federal judge and a
member of Congress, has argued that legislators are less concerned with a
law's constitutionality than with its political and practical import.38 Simi-
larly, other scholars have argued that because written constitutions are
designed in part to restrain majority rule, a regularly elected branch of
government like Congress is too subject to popular whims to enforce con-
stitutional commands effectively, particularly those which protect the
rights of minorities. 39 While Mikva and others may be correct that mem-
bers of Congress care more about the practical import and popularity of
laws they pass, it does not necessarily follow that there should be no con-
gressional role in constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, Congress'
views on the Constitution are valuable precisely because they are in-
formed by practical and political considerations that a more insulated
Court might ignore. 40
The Framers of the Constitution, aware of the "countermajoritarian
difficulty" years before that term was coined, 41 counted on a strong con-
gressional role in constitutional interpretation to help ensure that judicial
constitutional interpretation would not stray too far from popular legiti-
35. E.g., Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitution Interpreta-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 590 (1975); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support
and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 605-06 (1983).
36. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
37. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
38. Mikva, supra note 35, at 609-10.
39. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (1980); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996).
40. Katyal, supra note 22, at 1393 ("[T]he ways in which Congress interprets the con-
stitution can and should differ from the ways in which the court does."); Mark Tushnet,
Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal
Case Studies, 50 DUKE L.J. 1395, 1404-05 (2001).
41. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCH (1961).
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macy.42 Due to the frequency with which Congress faces the voters,43
Congress' views are more capable of offering a rough reflection of popu-
lar views of constitutional interpretation, whereas the Supreme Court-
due to the random timing of its members' appointments-is prone to tilt-
ing toward an unpopular or outdated political and constitutional ideol-
ogy.44 The legislative process is also more likely to consider a greater
diversity of views on constitutional interpretation, 45 as legislators regu-
larly meet with and receive input from constituents and interest groups
from a variety of educational, ethnic, religious, and professional back-
grounds. 46 The courts, by contrast, interpret the Constitution in a process
involving a relatively small and cloistered number of "elites:" the justices,
their law clerks, the lawyers who argue before the Court, and those who
write amicus briefs.47 Further, Congress enacts its laws with policymak-
ing tools unique to the legislative process, such as large staffs, subpoena
power, and the participation of the public, whereas the courts interpret
the Constitution only if and when a specific constitutional question is
presented properly in a lawsuit. 48
In sum, one need not refute the common understanding of Marbury
and Cooper as establishing the courts' final interpretive authority over
the Constitution's meaning to accept simultaneously the premise that
Congress has an important, even if non-final, role to play in the process of
constitutional interpretation. This premise is even more well-founded in
the context of deciding questions of executive power in times of armed
conflict, in which the Supreme Court itself, using the Steel-Seizure model,
has expressly relied on Congress' constitutional judgments to inform its
own reading of how much executive power the Constitution permits.
49
Unfortunately, in passing the MCA, Congress abdicated its responsibility
to interpret the Constitution by passing a law that it wanted to see invali-
42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982)
(arguing that Congress, through power of impeachment, would be able to prevent "deliber-
ate usurpations" of authority by judiciary); see also Letter from James Madison to Spencer
Roane (May 6, 1821), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1819-1836, at 55, 59 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1910) (noting that if members of Congress make bad constitutional decisions,
"their Constituents ... can certainly under the forms of the Constitution effectuate a com-
pliance with their deliberate judgments and settled determination").
43. Of course, as originally designed, senators did not face the voters directly but were
elected by state legislatures until that practice was changed by constitutional amendment in
1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
44. See supra note 31.
45. Katyal, supra note 22, at 1339-40.
46. See Bd. Of Trs. Of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (describing Congress' superior ability, as compared to courts, to find facts and
understand "public attitudes and beliefs").
47. Klarman, supra note 19, at 189-90. A small, elite group of lawyers dominates the
argument of cases before the Supreme Court like no other time since the late nineteenth
century. See generally Richard Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
48. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting); David L. Shapiro, Courts,
Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 551-52 (1988).
49. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 233 (Under Steel Seizure, "courts accord substantial def-
erence to a common constitutional view embraced by both Congress and the President.").
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dated or substantially altered by the courts. Understanding how and why
Congress might pass an intentionally unconstitutional law such as the
MCA's Section 7 requires briefly reviewing the two doctrines that the
Supreme Court has used to affirm, however emptily, the essentiality of
Congress' role in the process of constitutional interpretation: the pre-
sumption of constitutionality and the canon of avoidance.
A. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The Supreme Court routinely declares it axiomatic that laws passed by
Congress are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. 50 The Court
justifies this supposedly deferential approach on the basis of its "respect"
for the product of a "coordinate branch of government," 51 its hesitation
to invalidate the work of democratically elected representatives, 52 and its
belief that Congress "believe[s] its statutes to be consistent with the con-
stitutional commands. '53 The presumption of constitutionality thus pur-
ports to reflect the notion that congressional constitutional interpretation
is entitled to respect even where it produces results that differ from the
Court's beliefs about the Constitution's meaning. 54
As a matter of theory, the presumption of constitutionality has gener-
ated relatively little controversy. Most scholars seem to agree with the
abstract idea that enactments of Congress are due a presumption of valid-
ity,55 even if they disagree as to how strongly this presumption should
apply in any particular case. 56 More controversial than the theoretical
justifications for the presumption of constitutionality has been the man-
ner in which it has been applied in recent years. Particularly in the areas
of federalism and civil rights, the Supreme Court of the last two decades
has dutifully repeated the axiom that congressional acts receive a pre-
50. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 274 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action
at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 272 (1977).
51. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
52. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).
53. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 604 n.3 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) ("[W]e do
not impute to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion."); Mikva, supra note 35, at 590-91.
54. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (Congress "has not just the right but the
duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.").
55. E.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80,
121 (2001).
56. Although Mikva does not say so expressly, it seems that the logical conclusion of
his argument is that acts of Congress do not "deserve" a presumption of constitutionality.
See Mikva, supra note 35, at 609-10. Justice Antonin Scalia has actually stated this position
publicly in a speech at a conference, noting that "if Congress is going to take the attitude
that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the
Constitution . . . then perhaps th[e] presumption [of constitutionality] is unwarranted."
Colker & Brudney, supra note 55, at 80. Despite expressing these views in a speech, how-
ever, Justice Scalia has never articulated such a view from the bench; rather, he has joined,
without objection, opinions that invoke the notion that congressional enactments are enti-




sumption of validity while seeming to give them little deference at all.57
Between 1994 and 2004, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice William
Rehnquist struck down thirty federal statutes, ten more than the Court of
Chief Justice Earl Warren invalidated in a decade, more than the Loch-
ner-era Court,58 and far more than the one federal statute that the Court
invalidated during John Marshall's thirty-four-year chief justiceship. 59
Nowhere was the Rehnquist Court's jealous guardianship of its constitu-
57. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 55, at 105 ("Beginning in 1995, a longstanding
presumption of deference toward the work of Congress has been peeled away."). In its
federalism jurisprudence, the Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist backtracked signifi-
cantly from post-New Deal precedents such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), that showed significant deference to Con-
gress' exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. In prominent cases like United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), a majority
of the Rehnquist Court cast aside Congress' judgment about whether a particular activity
affected interstate commerce sufficiently to justify federal legislation. Although the Court
has more recently upheld congressional action justified under the Commerce Clause in
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), it is too soon to say whether Raich indicates a return
to pre-Lopez deference to Congress in the Commerce Clause realm. Compare JEFFREY
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 129 (2007) (de-
claring the federalism "revolution" dead), with David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with
Federalism: If It's Not Just a Battle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2094 (2006) ("[F]ederalism revival is still very much alive" despite
Raich.).
In the civil rights realm, the Court's 1997 decision in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), emphatically rejected Congress' attempt to protect religious liberty through the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). Congress had justified RFRA on the ba-
sis of its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to not just protect but also
identify constitutional violations. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966). The
Boerne Court made clear, however, that identifying constitutional violations was its exclu-
sive turf. 521 U.S. at 520; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 143 (2001); see also Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S.
598, 601-02 (2000) (invalidating the private-remedy provision of the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act despite Congress' determination that such a remedy was necessary to vindi-
cate more effectively the constitutional rights of women).
At the crossroads of individual rights and federalism, the Rehnquist Court took a restric-
tive view of Congress' ability to exercise its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers to
override state sovereign immunity. In a trio of cases on the topic-Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Board of Trustees of University of Ala-
bama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)-the Court invalidated three different federal statu-
tory provisions predicated on those powers. In Garrett, for instance, the Court invalidated
a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") of 1990 that allowed employ-
ees of state institutions to recover money damages against noncompliant state institutions,
despite elaborate legislative history detailing the discrimination faced by disabled state em-
ployees. 531 U.S. at 380-82. The Garrett majority, following Boerne, insisted that it was
the Court's responsibility, and not Congress', "to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees." Id. at 365. Although more recently, in 2003 and 2004, a divided Court upheld
laws premised on Congress' Section 5 powers against sovereign immunity challenges in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), neither case likely indicates a full-scale turn towards more def-
erence to Congress. Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Lane, for instance, made clear
that, per Boerne, the ultimate authority for determining the Fourteenth Amendment's con-
tours lay squarely with the Supreme Court. Lane, 541 U.S. at 520-21.
58. See generally The Rehnquist Court, 72 STANFORD LAW. 33 (2005) (comments of
Larry Kramer).
59. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1788 n.217 (2005).
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tional supremacy on display more than in Bush v. Gore, in which the
Court took the unprecedented step of effectively deciding a presidential
election, despite the prior understanding that Congress, rather than the
Supreme Court, had the final authority to resolve disputed presidential
elections. 60
In its dismissive attitude toward Congress, the Rehnquist Court suc-
ceeded in making the presumption of constitutionality a ritualistic recita-
tion of respect rather than a canon with any interpretive weight.61 As
Larry Kramer has explained, the Rehnquist Court "disowned the notion
of popular constitutionalism altogether, staking its claim to be the only
body empowered to interpret fundamental law with authority. '62 "What
Congress thinks about the Constitution," Kramer observed, "carries no
formal legal weight in the eyes of the Rehnquist Court, and has only so
much practical weight as the Justices think it deserves (which typically
turns out to be not much)."'63 Although it is too soon to say,64 the Rob-
erts Court does not appear especially inclined to loosen the grip on inter-
pretive supremacy that the Rehnquist Court so aggressively claimed in
areas like federalism and the First Amendment. 65
In many of the prominent cases in which the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts have rejected Congress' constitutional judgment, the Court's more
liberal justices-Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-have dissented.
While these same justices often assailed the Rehnquist Court's five-jus-
tice majority for disrespecting Congress' constitutional judgment, 66 they
too have voted to overturn federal statutes, demonstrating their own lack
of deference to Congress' views on different constitutional issues, such as
60. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How
THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); see also Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v.
hsuB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV.
170, 178 (2001).
61. TOOBIN, supra note 57, at 83 (noting that aside from Justice Breyer, the other
members of the Supreme Court had very little respect for Congress and the legislative
process).
62. Kramer, supra note 57, at 128.
63. Id.
64. In Chief Justice Roberts' first two years, the Supreme Court has upheld some high-
profile statutes against constitutional challenges, such as the Solomon Amendment, which
required law schools receiving federal funds to allow access to military recruiters, Rum-
sfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006), and the so-called "partial-birth" abortion ban enacted by
Congress in 2003. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
65. By votes of five-to-four, the Roberts Court has struck down two important provi-
sions of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation (the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002) on First Amendment grounds in the last two years. See Davis
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) (invalidating the BCRA's "millionaire's
amendment"); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007)(invalidating the BCRA's ban on "issue advertisements" shortly before an election). In its
federalism jurisprudence, the Roberts Court took a constricted view of the Clean Water
Act's definition of "navigable waters" in light of concerns that a broader reading of the
definition might violate the Commerce Clause. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
737-38 (2006).




in the case of so-called "partial-birth" abortion, 67 and, as discussed below,
in Boumediene.68 Disrespect for Congress' constitutional judgment,
therefore, has not been the exclusive province of the judicial right in re-
cent years, with the particular alignment of justices in any case involving
Congress' constitutional judgment varying based on the specific issue
presented. Nonetheless, the numbers speak for themselves, and the
Rehnquist Court's-particularly, the conservative five-justice bloc's-rel-
atively high rate of invalidating federal laws has likely had some effect on
Congress over time, decreasing Congress' constitutional self-confidence
and further cementing judicial supremacy, whether to be asserted by the
Court's right or left in any particular case.
B. THE ASHWANDER CANON OF AVOIDANCE
Also rooted in a purported respect for Congress' role in constitutional
interpretation is the so-called "canon of avoidance" or "canon of consti-
tutional doubt," a doctrine most commonly traced to Justice Louis Bran-
deis's concurring opinion in Ashwander,69 but with roots stretching back
to the earliest days of the Republic.70 The canon requires a court faced
with more than one plausible interpretation of a statute to choose the
interpretation that raises no doubt as to the statute's constitutionality,71
even if other interpretations might be otherwise more appealing. 72 The
canon has been justified in part by a supposed respect for Congress's in-
tent not to pass unconstitutional laws. 73 The Court has said that because
Congress "is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution,"
the Court will "not lightly assume that Congress intend[s] to infringe con-
stitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden
[to] it.''74 Thus, the Court assumes that Congress intends for its acts to be
67. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007).
68. See infra section IV.
69. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936). More specifically,
the "canon of avoidance" discussed in this section stems from the last of the seven "rules"
articulated by Justice Brandeis in his Ashwander concurrence, all of which identified ways
in which the federal courts have avoided deciding constitutional questions. Id. at 348
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in ques-
tion, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided."). The seventh rule is distinct from the fourth rule
cited by Brandeis that is sometimes also referred to as the "canon of avoidance": that "the
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of." Id. at 347.
70. Id. at 354-55.
71. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Although they stand for the same principle, DeBartolo is now cited
as often as Ashwander. Schauer, supra note 11, at 72.
72. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Ashwander requires Court to "select less plausible candidates from within the range of
permissible constructions.").
73. The Court has also cited its desire to avoid the "delicate process of constitutional
adjudication" and its countermajoritarian consequences. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352
U.S. 567, 590 (1957).
74. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
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construed as passing constitutional muster-i.e., surviving judicial re-
view-even if other signs of legislative intent indicate otherwise. 75 When
it invokes Ashwander, the Court essentially recognizes two simultaneous
"intents" of Congress that can lead to different interpretations of a single
statute: a specific intent with respect to what the particular statute might
mean based on the normal indicia thereof (such as text and legislative
history), and an over-arching meta-intent of Congress to legislate in a
manner that will survive judicial review. When the Court invokes Ash-
wander, the meta-intent of Congress to act constitutionally (i.e., survive
judicial review) is presumed to trump the more specific intent Congress
evinced when passing the legislation.
Many scholars have criticized the intent-based justification for Ash-
wander, arguing that Congress intends for all of its statutes to be inter-
preted based on the usual indicia of legislative meaning (text, history,
purpose, etc.), and does not intend for certain statutes to be interpreted
in a more twisted manner just to survive judicial review.76 This criticism
alleges that when Ashwander is a factor in a court's interpretation of a
particular statute, the court necessarily chooses an interpretation that is
less optimal than that which would have resulted from an application of
the standard, non-Ashwander rules of statutory construction. 77 Professor
Frederick Schauer has speculated that Congress might even prefer its
statutes to be interpreted more "naturally" and struck down as unconsti-
tutional than to be transmogrified per Ashwander and upheld.78 Indeed,
as explained in more depth below, the Boumediene majority refused to
apply Ashwander to remedy the constitutional flaws in Section 7 of the
MCA, asserting that "[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance does not
supplant traditional modes of statutory interpretation. '79 To some of
Ashwander's critics, Boumediene's outright invalidation of the MCA's
Section 7 may have been a better result than an aggressive judicial trans-
mogrification of the legislation's meaning, as proposed by the Solicitor
General at oral argument and Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent.8 0
A stronger critique of the Ashwander canon is that it does not demon-
strate any respect for an independent congressional role in constitutional
interpretation. The Court's intent-based justification for the Ashwander
canon assumes that when Congress legislates, it adheres to the Court's
75. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319
(1957); FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1924); see also Coenen, supra note
11, at 1607.
76. A separate, common criticism of the Ashwander canon is that it leads to half-
baked judicial consideration of constitutional issues. In determining whether there is a
constitutional question to avoid, a court per Ashwander necessarily engages in some-but
not full-fledged-consideration of the potential constitutional question to be avoided. Er-
nest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judi-
cial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1581-82 (2000).
77. Schauer, supra note 11, at 83; Lisa A. Kloppenberg, The Avoidance Canon: From
the Cold War to the War on Terror, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 349, 351 (2007).
78. Schauer, supra note 11, at 95.
79. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271 (2008).
80. See infra note 295-99 and accompanying text.
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vision of the Constitution. It is in this sense that there can be considera-
ble tension between the presumption of constitutionality and the Ash-
wander canon. 81 Per Ashwander, the Court simply assumes that
Congress, above all, does not want its statutes invalidated. 82 The Court
does not, at least as Ashwander has been applied in recent years, consider
the possibility that Congress interprets the Constitution in a different
manner and then afford that different interpretation a level of respect, an
approach that a meaningful presumption of constitutionality would seem
to require. 83 However, as demonstrated by the passage of the MCA, ex-
plained below, many members of Congress now depend upon the Court's
use of Ashwander as an additional option-besides outright judicial inval-
idation-to "clean up" bills that they find objectionable for constitutional
reasons. In a sense, this congressional dependence on post-enactment ju-
dicial transmogrification of a statute's meaning provides an intent-based
justification for Ashwander that is somewhat different from that espoused
by the Supreme Court.84
II. WHY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS VOTE FOR
INTENTIONALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
LEGISLATION AND THE PROBLEM
OF INTENT
That members of Congress would vote for legislation they want to be
either invalidated or substantially altered may strike some readers as sur-
prising and others as obvious. The idea may surprise people because it is
inconsistent with the traditional narrative of legislators as public servants
who swear oaths to uphold the Constitution. 85 Moreover, constituents, at
least at an abstract level, likely expect their elected representatives to
abide by the Constitution. Further, despite the Supreme Court's recent
evident disrespect for an independent congressional role in constitutional
interpretation, the Court's opinions nonetheless dutifully repeat the no-
tion (or fiction) that Congress legislates within constitutional bounds.86
On the other hand, one might expect that an abstract concern for the
Constitution ranks quite low for the average member of Congress. One
might expect that members are more likely to be motivated by concerns
like representing constituent preferences, effecting good public policy, se-
curing re-election, gaining influence in Congress, and ensuring a remu-
81. Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding Avoidance: Why Use of the Constitutional Avoidance
Canon Undermines Judicial Independence-A Response to Lisa Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1057, 1065-66 (2006).
82. See Schauer, supra note 11, at 82 ("Congress certainly has a desire, we can assume,
not to have its statutes declared unconstitutional.").
83. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 231, 250.
84. Kloppenberg, supra note 11, at 19-20.
85. See supra note 1.
86. Finley v. NEA, 524 U.S. 569, 604 n.3 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); Edward J.




nerative post-congressional career, some or all of which may take
precedence over a member's more abstract constitutional principles, if
any. 87
To some degree, however, the dichotomy between an abstract concern
for the Constitution and at least some of the political pressures that influ-
ence a legislator's stand on constitutional issues is a false one, for the
political accountability of Congress is much of what makes its role in con-
stitutional interpretation so valuable.8 8 To the extent, therefore, that a
legislator articulates a stand on a constitutional issue that is informed by
his constituents' preferences, re-election concerns, or views of good pub-
lic policy-rather than his personal views on abstract constitutional the-
ory-he is not necessarily abdicating his role as a constitutional
interpreter. Indeed, it is important to be clear that my discussion of in-
tent does not concern itself with the privately held constitutional views of
a legislator. If, for instance, a legislator takes a public stand on a particu-
lar constitutional issue but tells her husband in private that she really
does not agree with that stance, that legislator's "true" beliefs about the
issue, if discoverable, would be irrelevant to the question of legislative
intent, for such views were not aired in the public realm that gives legisla-
tive intent its legitimacy as an interpretive tool.89 As discussed here,
therefore, "intent" includes only the publicly revealed views of members
of Congress, as reflected through votes on statutes that affect constitu-
tional interpretation, through statements made on the floor of the legisla-
ture, in correspondence with constituents, in statements to the media,
etc.90
The constitutional design, and the Steel-Seizure model in particular, as-
sume that whatever political benefits and costs are associated with voting
for or against a particular statute will be roughly internalized by members
of Congress. By political benefits, I mean support from constituents in
the form of votes for a member in his next general election, as well as
support from organizations that help a member obtain votes, such as
campaign contributions and praise from the media. Conversely, political
costs include votes against a candidate in the next election, as well as
opposition from organizations designed to oust a candidate or hurt his re-
election chances, which may take the form of contributions to the mem-
ber's next general election opponent, "issue advertisements" run against
the member, and critical editorials in local newspapers. In theory, when
Congress considers legislation, each member keeps an eye on the political
costs and benefits of his potential support for or opposition to such legis-
lation. In the Steel-Seizure context, members of Congress weigh the polit-
87. John A. Clark & Kevin T. McGuire, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Flag, 49
POL. REs. Q. 771, 773-74 (1996); Timothy Noah, Why Congressmen Want to Be Lobbyists,
SLATE, June 30, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2085071/.
88. See supra notes 40 to 48 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 103 to 109 and accompanying text.
90. For discussion of the relative weight afforded to some of the different sources of
legislative history, see infra note 96.
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ical costs and benefits of voting for or against legislation that might
expand executive power during a time of armed conflict. The political
costs associated with a vote in favor of expanding executive power tradi-
tionally include the possibility that the legislator will be accused of in-
creasing presidential power at the expense of some other value like civil
liberties. The political costs associated with voting against expanded ex-
ecutive power traditionally include the risk that a political opponent will
attack the legislator as weak on national security.
When, however, members of Congress rely on potential judicial re-
view-rather than their own votes-to kill legislation that they would
otherwise oppose, they seek to externalize onto the judiciary more of the
political costs of invalidating a law. For example, a member of Congress
seeking re-election may have serious, publicly stated constitutional con-
cerns about a particular piece of legislation, but when faced with the pos-
sibility of a bruising re-election campaign in which his potential opponent
might use a vote against the constitutionally questionable legislation to
attack him, he may vote for the legislation. The incumbent member will
feel more comfortable voting for the legislation if he knows-or at least
feels reasonably confident-that the judiciary will clean up the legislation
by striking it down or substantially altering its meaning per Ashwander.
The legislator may, therefore, vote for the bill while at the same time
publicly declaring it to be unconstitutional in the hopes that his comments
serve as a signal to the courts to clean up the bill. If the legislator is
correct in counting on an impending judicial cleanup to invalidate the
law, he has nonetheless insulated himself from the traditional costs of
voting for more executive power because he can tell his potentially angry
constituents: "I voted for the law, but that didn't matter because the
courts struck it down." To be sure, it is possible that the member may
receive criticism for his apparent hypocrisy in voting for legislation that
he publicly declares to be unconstitutional. Because the member none-
theless voted for the bill, however, any attack along such lines will neces-
sarily be subtle and might not translate well to the kind of thirty-second
television advertisement that is a staple of modern political campaigns.
If enough legislators emulate this hypothetical member, Congress
would produce a statute that is less helpful to a court applying the Steel-
Seizure model, in which the Court relies on Congress' constitutional judg-
ment to inform the Court's own judgment regarding executive power. 91
Rather than represent the best bill that the democratic process can pro-
duce, to which the Court can react based on its own, different set of con-
stitutional interpretive tools, Congress would send to the courts a law
passed with the intent of being invalidated or altered by the courts, im-
posing upon the courts, rather than Congress, the lion's share of political
costs involved in remedying constitutional flaws. While the judiciary may
91. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 224-25. I assume for now that the unconstitutional intent
can be imputed to the entire Congress, a problem which I address more extensively below.
See infra Section II.B.
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be more than able to bear such costs in light of its members' life tenure
and its perceived institutional legitimacy, 92 the interpretive process is
weakened because Congress merely passes to the courts the task of con-
stitutional interpretation, rather than playing the integral role in the pro-
cess that Steel Seizure envisions.
The phenomenon of legislative logrolling only increases the possibility
that a member of Congress will vote for legislation that he publicly de-
cries as unconstitutional. So long as constitutional concerns are subject to
bargaining like other legislative goods (and it would be unrealistic to as-
sume that they are not, despite legislators' oaths to the contrary), a mem-
ber of Congress may vote for an omnibus bill that benefits a pet project in
his district even if the bill contains a provision which, if considered on its
own, he would publicly oppose as unconstitutional and vote against. 93
The degree to which a particular member will sacrifice constitutional con-
cerns depends upon the intensity of those concerns and the benefits re-
ceived in exchange for sacrificing them.94 While the incentive for
members of Congress to logroll constitutional concerns would exist even
in the absence of judicial review, the prospect of judicial invalidation and
Ashwander transmogrification increases it significantly. A member's pro-
clivity to bargain away constitutional qualms increases if he can simulta-
neously argue against the constitutionality of the dubious part of the
legislation and if he believes that this publicly stated opposition might
influence the courts' subsequent consideration of this potentially uncon-
stitutional provision.95
92. Indeed, Dean Lisa Kloppenberg has asserted that the courts enjoy sufficient politi-
cal legitimacy to support their shouldering constitutional burdens alone. Kloppenberg,
supra note 11, at 15, 92.
93. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 85-86
(1989) (explaining that "[l]ogrolling and vote tradeoffs are accepted parts of the legislative
process," whereas courts' treat constitutional issues "as a matter of principle").
94. Members of Congress representing constituents who care deeply about particular
constitutional issues may be highly unlikely to bargain away constitutional concerns touch-
ing those issues. Pro-gun members of Congress who describe themselves as committed to
"Second Amendment rights," see, for example, Larry Craig, United States Senator for
Idaho, Second Amendment Rights, http://craig.senate.gov/isecamend.cfm (last visited
June 8, 2008) ("[O]ne of the strongest safeguards of our republic is the Constitution's pro-
tection of the right to keep and bear arms."), and liberal Democrats who describe them-
selves as committed to protecting constitutional freedom of speech, see for example,
Representative Jerrold Nadler, New York's Eighth Congressional District, Biography,
http://www.house.gov/nadler/biography.shtml (last visited July 27, 2008) ("Nadler has ...
been a consistent champion of freedom of expression, fighting countless efforts to restrict
speech and quell dissent."), would probably be much less likely to bargain away those
concerns. Similarly, some members of Congress may be less likely to bargain away certain
constitutional concerns because they have developed a reputation for being "principled," a
reputation which may help them politically even if they take constitutional stands unpopu-
lar with their constituents.
95. The presence of severability clauses in legislation also can lower the price of bar-
gaining away constitutional concerns. If a congressman is particularly concerned about the
constitutionality of one specific provision of a larger legislative package, but supports the
rest of the package, he can more easily vote in favor of the entire legislative package know-
ing that the constitutionally problematic provision may be judicially invalidated but the
remainder of the legislation will survive.
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A member of Congress can communicate his opposition to the consti-
tutionality of a bill for which he votes by helping to establish the bill's
legislative history. A member may make committee or floor statements
to the effect that he believes the bill is unconstitutional but will vote for it
anyway. 96 A member may also make statements to constituents and the
media, either personally or through his surrogates, indicating his motives
in voting for the bill, although such statements are generally not afforded
the same interpretive weight as floor statements by courts even if they are
an essential part of how a member of Congress justifies his vote to his
constituents. 97 A member may also directly communicate with the courts
by filing an amicus brief with the Supreme Court arguing for invalidation
of the very legislation for which he voted.98
A. OBJECTIONS TO THE CONCEPT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND
ITS RELEVANCE
One might argue that the mixed motives of members of Congress are
irrelevant to statutory interpretation because courts should concern
themselves only with the purported final product of the legislative pro-
cess-a law's text. There is a long line of academic and judicial opposi-
tion to courts' use of legislative intent, viewing intent as shrouded in
subjectivity and ripe for manipulation by lawmakers. 99 Scholars like Max
Radin have savaged legislative intent as a "transparent and absurd fic-
tion," the search for which by courts is likely to be futile, given the impos-
sibility of knowing what was on the minds of hundreds of legislators at
96. Specifically, courts use the floor and committee statements of individual legisla-
tors, as well as committee reports and testimony from the committees that draft legislation
to discern legislative intent. Some commentators have asserted that, as an empirical mat-
ter, courts afford statements of individual lawmakers less weight than committee reports.
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative
Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History,
1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 51. Other commentators have argued that individual statements should
be afforded little weight because they shed scant light on the legislature's overall intent.
Laurence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent
in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 447-48 (2005). While it is true that an individ-
ual legislator's comments might not reflect the views of any other member of the legisla-
ture, committee reports are often drafted by unelected congressional staffers and are not
always even read by the legislators who vote on the bill. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Moreover, insofar as the search for legislative
intent, however foolhardy, is an attempt to discern "what the voting Members of Congress
actually had in mind," statements of the legislators who vote for a bill are likely to be some
of the best evidence of their intentions. Id. Finally, even if it is correct that, as an empiri-
cal matter, courts afford less weight to individual statements than to committee reports, the
Supreme Court nonetheless routinely looks to the statements of individual lawmakers to
help it interpret laws. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2766 n.10 (2006).
97. See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpre-
tive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1254, 1330-33 (2000) (arguing that "public justification" is the
reason why courts should look to legislative history).
98. This is what Arlen Specter did after, as discussed below, voting for the Military
Commissions Act while simultaneously arguing that its Section 7 was unconstitutional. See
Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Arlen Specter in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
99. To be sure, being anti-intent and a textualist are not necessarily the same thing.
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the time at which they voted.' 00 Radin and others have argued that even
if legislative intent were knowable, there is no reason why it should bind
courts, as the legislature's job is only to pass legislation, not tell society
what it means, a task which appropriately falls to the courts.' 0 ' Among
the justices of the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia has most fa-
mously urged his colleagues not to consider legislative intent, at least in
instances where the statute's text is sufficiently clear.' 0
2
There is undoubtedly some merit to the objections that have been
raised by the anti-intent crowd. Nonetheless, this Article assumes that
legislative intent is and should be relevant to statutory interpretation.
While it is beyond this Article's purview to offer a full-throated defense
of the relevance of legislative intent, and many others have already done
so,10 3 a brief explanation of the utility and relevance of legislative intent
to statutory interpretation should suffice. Judicial consideration of legis-
lative intent imbues the interpretive process with additional democratic
legitimacy. 10 4 One need not view courts as the mere interpretive
"agents" of the legislature 0 5 to believe that it is appropriate for courts to
attempt broadly to effectuate the goals of the legislature, and, thus, that it
is appropriate for courts to rely on more than just the statutory text to
discern such goals. Bare reference to statutory text is often unhelpful and
indeterminate. 10 6 A court that ignores legislative intent-which is usually
derived from legislative history-when interpreting indeterminate text is
more likely to reach conclusions that reflect the judges' own policy pref-
erences rather than the legislature's. As Professor Bernard Bell has ar-
gued, legislative history-particularly, individual members' statements-
comprises the public justifications legislators give their constituents for
their votes. 10 7 Ignoring these justifications in interpreting a statute un-
moors the statute from its democratic foundation. In part due to these
concerns, while intent need not be determinative of a statute's meaning, a
broad consensus exists that it-and legislative history in particular-
100. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390-91 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that "statements of individual Members of Congress"
are not reliable indicators of legislative intent); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-
53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators'
intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an
unenacted legislative intent.").
103. See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of the
Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901
(2000); Solan, supra note 96.
104. Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 18-19 (1998).
105. See generally, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).
106. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 89 (1984).
107. Bell, supra note 97, at 1330-33.
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should at least be part of judges' interpretive method. 10 8 Indeed, Justice
Scalia has found few other federal judges, much less fellow justices of the
Supreme Court, who subscribe to his so-called "textualist" approach to
statutory interpretation.10 9
Nonetheless, one might argue that even if legislative intent should gen-
erally be relevant to statutory interpretation, it should not be considered
relevant by courts when it reveals that a legislator voted for a law that he
wants to be invalidated or transmogrified by the courts. In other words,
one might argue that a specific exception to the general reliance on intent
is required to eliminate the legislative incentive to pass intentionally un-
constitutional laws. The problem with such an approach, as illustrated by
the Supreme Court's consideration of the MCA, discussed below, is that
it might require the Court to approve-or at least give more deference
to-legislation that both members of Congress and the Court would
rather invalidate. While such an approach might discourage members of
Congress in the future from so heavily relying on the courts to invalidate
or transmogrify the legislation per Ashwander, the interim costs of ap-
proving the legislation-in terms of validating a scheme that members of
both Congress and the Court consider objectionable on policy, constitu-
tional, and normative grounds-may be too high to bear.110
B. AMALGAMATING INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS' INTENTS
Even accepting that there will be circumstances in which one particular
legislator votes for legislation that she wants invalidated by the courts,
one might consider it highly unlikely that a legislature as a whole would
ever pass an intentionally unconstitutional law. Overcoming legislative
inertia requires significant effort and resources by members of Congress
and their staffs, as well as lobbying by interest groups. Why would a suffi-
cient number of members ever expend large amounts of their limited
time and energy to pass a bill that they want to see judicially invalidated?
Moreover, even if some members of the enacting coalition publicly ex-
press doubts about the constitutionality of a bill for which they vote in
favor, it is not clear how or why those individuals' doubts should be rele-
vant to the collective intent of the legislative body regarding the bill's
constitutionality. Indeed, the difficulty of amalgamating the various in-
tents of individual legislators is a major reason why textualists and other
scholars have questioned the value of courts searching for legislative in-
tent when interpreting statutes."'
In some instances, pressure for a bill from outside interest groups or
from the executive branch may be so great that many legislators in the
108. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:05 (2005).
109. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509,
1513 (1998).
110. Cf. Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, supra note 105, at 2179.
111. Radin, supra note 100, at 870-71; see generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a
They, Not an It: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
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enacting coalition-theoretically, even every single member-decide to
expend the necessary energy to pass a bill to avoid what they fear will be
severe political consequences of not acting.112 The more probable judi-
cial invalidation (or substantial alteration) of an otherwise politically pop-
ular bill, the less members risk in passing it, even if they expend time and
energy going through the motions of the legislative process. If the enact-
ing coalition can signal clearly its preference for invalidation or substan-
tial alteration to the judiciary through public statements and believes that
the judiciary will respond accordingly, its members will see less risk in
passing an intentionally unconstitutional bill.
The more likely scenario, however, involves a bill that passes with the
support of at least some members who intend for the law to be upheld by
the courts, along with the support of others who intend for the law to be
invalidated or substantially altered per Ashwander.113 Assume that some
members, called the "Pros," support a bill and want it to be validated by
the courts. The Pros are likely to provide the impetus for the bill's pas-
sage by sponsoring the legislation, pushing it through committee, etc. On
their own, however, the Pros might not comprise enough members to
pass the legislation. To ensure the bill's passage, the Pros must attract the
support of other members who have varying degrees of qualms about the
bill's constitutionality. Some of these others, whom I call the "Tepid An-
tis," may even dislike the bill altogether, believing it to be unconstitu-
tional, but will vote for the bill if the political pressure or other benefits of
voting "yea" are great enough and if the possibility of judicial invalida-
tion or transmogrification is sufficiently certain. Thus, the Tepid Antis,
who would likely not have expended the energy and political capital to
push the bill through the legislative process, may nonetheless provide the
votes or assistance necessary to ensure the bill's passage, but with the
specific intent, evidenced by their public statements, that the law be inval-
idated as unconstitutional or substantially altered per Ashwander.1" 4
In attempting to impute to a multi-member legislative body a single,
collective intent, courts should afford especial interpretive weight to the
views of marginal legislators, like the Tepid Antis, without whose support
the bill would not have passed. The political scientists Matthew McCub-
bins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast-collectively known as McNoll-
gast-have argued persuasively why it is essential, when interpreting a
statute, to examine the role of "veto players" in the legislative process.
McNollgast define a "veto player" as an "individual... or group of indi-
viduals ... whose consent is needed for legislation to pass.11 5 In most
112. Indeed, when outside pressure is great, it is likely that the outside groups supplying
the pressure will be happy to do much of the work involved in passing legislation, such as
writing the initial draft of the bill.
113. There may also be some members of Congress in the middle who are ambivalent
about the bill's constitutionality.
114. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 80 GEO. L. J. 705, 713 (1992).
115. Id. at 707 n.5.
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instances, veto players are those particularly powerful legislators-for ex-
ample, committee chairman or party leaders-who let a bill proceed past
procedural hurdles or "veto gates" that might have killed it. Because
"veto players" are crucial to a law's passage, McNollgast argue, their indi-
vidual intents are particularly relevant to determining the collective in-
tent of the legislative body.116  In the case of intentionally
unconstitutional legislation, the "veto players" may be the Tepid Antis
whose support provides the crucial marginal votes to pass the legislation.
The Tepid Antis may share the ultimate goal of those Antis who vote
against the legislation. They want the legislation either to be invalidated
or go into effect only in a manner drastically different, per Ashwander
transmogrification, from the manner in which the Pros envision, but they
rely on judicial action to accomplish this end rather than their own votes.
Table 1, which borrows somewhat from a similar formulation used by po-
litical theorist Jon Elster,117 illustrates the dynamic: 118
Group Goal Means Vote on Bill
Pros Bill becomes operative law. Vote for and courts uphold. Yea
Tepid Antis Bill does not become oper- Vote for and rely on courts Yea
ative law to invalidate.
Antis Bill does not become oper- Vote against Nay
ative law
Even members who vote against final passage can nonetheless provide
crucial support to the passage of a constitutionally dubious bill by facili-
tating the bill's clearance of "veto gates" along the way. In the Senate,
for instance, the procedural hurdle of the filibuster requires sixty votes to
circumvent, rather than a mere majority.119 In some instances, senators
who intend to vote against a bill on its merits nonetheless vote to cut off
debate and move the bill forward to an "up-or-down" vote.120 These sen-
ators' votes not to filibuster are, therefore, crucial to the bill's moving
forward. Even if these senators-whom I call the Moderate Antis (as
opposed to the Fervent Antis, who vote to filibuster and against the bill's
final passage)-ultimately vote against the bill on its merits, their intent
in letting the bill move forward is relevant to determining the intent of
Congress as a whole, as illustrated by Table 2.
116. Paul G. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1284 n.85 (2005).
117. Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
101 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
118. For the sake of simplicity, the table excludes the possibility of Ashwander trans-
mogrification as well as members expressing only ambivalence about-as opposed to sup-
port for or opposition to-the bill on constitutional grounds.
119. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 22.2, available at http://rules.senate.gov/
senaterules/rule22.php (last visited June 8, 2008).
120. The minority party allowing straight "up-or-down" votes has become increasingly
rare, with filibusters currently being used more than ever in recent history. David Her-




Group Goal Means Filibuster Vote on Bill
Pros Bill becomes opera- Vote for and courts Yea Yea
tive law. uphold.
Tepid Antis Bill does not Vote for but rely on Yea Yea
become operative courts to invalidate.
law.
Moderate Antis Bill does not Vote against on mer- Yea Nay
become operative its but rely on courts
law. to invalidate.
Fervent Antis Bill does not Filibuster and vote Nay Nay
become operative against.
law.
In some instances, party leaders will reach agreement early in the legis-
lative process that a particular piece of legislation will be allowed an up-
or-down vote on the Senate floor, effectively withdrawing the threat of a
filibuster from members of either party. In such instances, understanding
why a party leader takes the filibuster off the table is also particularly
crucial to understanding the legislature's intent in passing the law. Even
in instances where more than sixty members of the Senate ultimately vote
for a proposed bill on its merits, some of the marginal members of the
coalition of sixty or more senators may vote for the legislation because
they view it as a fait accompli once the leaders have withdrawn the threat
of a filibuster. In other words, members who may have been Fervent or
Moderate Anti will switch to Tepid Anti once the filibuster threat has
been removed and the bill's moving forward has been assured. The
chances of members switching from Fervent Anti to Moderate Anti or
Tepid Anti likely increase in relation to members' understanding that the
courts are likely to invalidate the constitutionally dubious bill or trans-
mogrify it per Ashwander.
One might object to the above application of the McNollgast theory of
statutory intent for giving too much weight to the individual intents of the
legislators who provide the marginal votes. If, for instance, forty-nine
senators publicly articulate their support for a bill's constitutionality, yet
eleven other senators who have publicly articulated opposition on consti-
tutional grounds join them to end a filibuster, and two of those eleven
join the forty-nine in voting for final passage, should the constitutional
reservations of just two or eleven members of only one house of Congress
sully the entire bill? While this is an objection not without some merit,
the legislation would not have passed without the support of the eleven
or two senators, making their votes proximate causes of the bill's passage.
The causal influence of these marginal supporters makes their intent,
when knowable, at least highly relevant to the legislature's collective
intent.
Moreover, in most legislative debates, it is a small subset-say, ten or
twenty percent-of members who explain their support for or opposition
to a bill. Despite this small sample, courts frequently extrapolate from
the statements of this subset to impute a collective intent to the cham-
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ber.121 Such extrapolation is justified in part because when it is impossi-
ble to know what every legislator was thinking, courts impute to the
collective the publicly stated intents of the few.122 Relatedly, under the
theory that legislators offer comments in an attempt to influence col-
leagues, courts assume that the final result reflects a collective under-
standing that the majority is voting for the bill as it has been described by
its supporters. 123 Hence, it is similarly justifiable to extrapolate intent
from a small number of legislators who publicly proclaim the unconstitu-
tionality of a law for which they nonetheless vote, particularly if such
members provide support essential to the law's passage.
124
III. SECTION 7 OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT AS
INTENTIONALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Military Commissions Act of 2006-specifically, its habeas-strip-
ping provision-is the most prominent recent example of an intentionally
unconstitutional law.125 The MCA's intentional unconstitutionality is
particularly disturbing because of the context in which the law was
passed: in response to a Supreme Court decision that sought to prod a
reticent Congress to involve itself in the formation of detainee policy in
the "war on terror." Before September 11, 2001, the United States gener-
ally detained and tried the captured perpetrators of terrorist attacks
against Americans through the federal civilian criminal justice system,
which affords a panoply of constitutional and statutory protections to the
accused. 126 September 11, however, "changed everything," or at least
changed much, with respect to terrorist suspects. Seven days after Sep-
tember 11, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), which authorized the President to "use
all necessary and appropriate force" against those who "planned, author-
121. Bell, supra note 97, at 1332.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1332, 1335; James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative His-
tory Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 54
(2007).
124. It is important to point out that McNollgast themselves appear to disagree with
affording any interpretive weight to the individual statements of members of Congress
because "talk is cheap." McNollgast, supra note 114, at 726. They fear that according
interpretive weight to such individual statements "can change the policy bargain struck by
the enacting coalition." Id. at 717. What McNollgast ignore, however, is that the legisla-
tive bargain itself may include provisions that many members intend to be subsequently
judicially invalidated or transmogrified.
125. I cannot say whether any other laws passed by Congress can fairly be described as
"intentionally unconstitutional" under the approach articulated in this Article. While I am
not aware of any to which I would apply that label, I have not delved into the legislative
history of every other statute passed by Congress in its 220-year history.
126. Criminal prosecutions were pursued successfully against the perpetrators and co-
conspirators of the first World Trade Center bombing of 1993, the Oklahoma City federal
building bombing of 1995, the Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi Arabia of 1996, and the
1998 East Africa embassy bombings. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 116-17 (2004). The United States also investigated the
October 2000 attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen with an eye toward criminal
prosecution. Id. at 192-97.
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ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks ... or harbored such orga-
nizations or persons.' u2 7 In passing the AUMF, Congress gave its
unequivocal green light to President George W. Bush to invade Afghani-
stan and root out the Taliban, the regime that had harbored al Qaeda, the
international terrorist organization responsible for the September 11 at-
tacks. A month later, United States military forces began their invasion
of Afghanistan.' 28
As in any armed struggle, the United States captured enemy prisoners
in Afghanistan, some of whom were handed over to the United States by
the Northern Alliance, a friendly coalition of military groups also op-
posed to the Taliban. The United States housed most of these prisoners
at detention camps in Afghanistan, but beginning in January 2002, the
United States began exporting "high-value detainees"-those prisoners
considered especially dangerous or possessing particularly useful infor-
mation-from Afghanistan to detention facilities at the United States Na-
val Base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba,129 a location chosen by government
officials because of its ambiguous legal status. 130 While the base was
under United States control, it was not sovereign United States territory
and, therefore, the administration thought that the federal courts would
not have jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions brought by Guantinamo
detainees. 13' The United States eventually transported terrorist suspects
and alleged al Qaeda affiliates captured in other nations, such as Paki-
stan, Bosnia, and the Philippines, to Guantinamo.
Whereas in prior armed conflicts the United States had treated most
captured enemy combatants as prisoners of war,132 the detainees held at
Guantinamo were not accorded that status and its attendant protections.
Rather, alleged members of al Qaeda, whether rounded up in Afghani-
stan or elsewhere, were considered members of a rogue, stateless interna-
tional terrorist organization that did not obey the laws of war, and, thus,
were "unlawful combatants" not protected by the Geneva Conven-
tions. 133 Even fighters for the Taliban, the regime which had ruled most
of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, were classified as non-POW unlawful
combatants, under the theory that Afghanistan under Taliban rule was a
failed state and the Taliban was functionally indistinguishable from al
127. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
128. Eric Schmitt & Steven Lee Myers, A Nation Challenged: Military; More than 100
G.l.'s in Afghan Ground Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at Al.
129. Katherine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Detention Camp: U.S. to Hold
Taliban Detainees in 'the Least Worst Place,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B6.
130. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 142-43 (2006) ("[N]o location was perfect," but Guantinamo "seemed to fit the
bill .... [Tihe federal courts probably wouldn't consider Gitmo as falling within their
habeas jurisdiction.").
131. Id.
132. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
133. Memorandum from John Yoo to William J. Haynes II, Jan. 9, 2002, in THE TOR-
TURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].
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Qaeda. 134 As unlawful combatants, the Guantdnamo detainees were
deemed not entitled to the customary determination of combatant status
by a "competent tribunal" of the capturing nation,135 which meant that
they had no formal, legal method by which to protest their detention as
enemy combatants. Furthermore, the determination that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda detainees deprived those detain-
ees of the Conventions' protections of humane treatment. Although the
United States asserted that it would treat the Guantdnamo detainees "hu-
manely" and, "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military ne-
cessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of" the Geneva
Conventions,t 36 the lack of clear legal protection for the detainees un-
doubtedly facilitated their subsequent inhumane treatment by guards and
interrogators. 137 The executive branch alone-with no express input
from Congress-made all of these important initial decisions regarding
the treatment of "war-on-terror" detainees.
The executive branch also determined that the inapplicability of the
Geneva Conventions to Guant~namo detainees allowed those detainees
to be eligible for trial by military commission for war crimes, rather than
by court-martial, 38 which had been the standard method for trying en-
emy combatants since World War 11.139 To that end, in November 2001,
President Bush decreed by executive order that noncitizens suspected of
terrorist activity were eligible for trial by military commission for war
crimes. 140 These commissions would provide significantly fewer protec-
tions for defendants than those afforded by courts-martial under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice.' 41 Within just a few months after
September 11, therefore, the executive branch had unilaterally and dra-
matically shifted the paradigm for detaining and trying terrorists from a
134. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales and William J. Haynes
II, Jan. 22, 2002, in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 133, at 82.
135. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Feb. 7, 2002, in TOR-
TURE PAPERS, supra note 133, at 136, 143; Memorandum from George W. Bush to the Vice
President et al., Feb. 7, 2002, in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 133, at 134-35 [hereinafter
"Bush Memo"]. Although the White House had initially said that the Geneva Conven-
tions would not apply to either the Taliban or al Qaeda, see Memorandum from Alberto R.
Gonzales to George W. Bush, Jan. 25, 2002, in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 133, at 118, it
partly switched course by agreeing to apply the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban, Bush
Memo, supra, at 134-35, although not in a manner that recognized Taliban fighters as en-
joying the full protections as prisoners of war entitled to status determination tribunals.
136. Bush Memo, supra note 135, at 135.
137. E.g., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Aug. 9, 2004,
in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 133, at 1132, 1161-62.
138. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 88, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
139. Capt. Brian C. Baldrate, The Supreme Court's Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of
Military Tribunals: A Study, Critique & Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 69-71 (2005).
140. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). Exactly which crimes would
be tried by military commission would be determined by subsequent Department of De-
fense regulations. Id.; see also Draft Military Commission Instruction, Feb. 28, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.au.af.mil/am/awcawcgate/law/d20030228dmci.pdf.
141. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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civilian criminal model to one that lay outside the civilian-and even the
regular military-justice systems. Although Congress held some hearings
on detention issues142 and some members of Congress were briefed by
the Bush administration on specific aspects of detention policy from time
to time,' 43 Congress remained largely on the sidelines while the executive
branch implemented these dramatic changes. 144
In contrast to, and perhaps because of, Congress's initial lack of in-
volvement in formulating detainee policy, the federal courts quickly
found themselves in the middle of the issue when, in February 2002, a
large number of Guantinamo detainees sued to contest their deten-
tion. 145 The detainees alleged that their confinement violated the Consti-
tution, federal laws, and treaties to which the United States was a
signatory.146 They argued that they had a right to contest their detention
in federal court under the federal habeas statute-28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-43-
which granted the federal courts the authority to hear petitions for writs
of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions" challenging un-
lawful detention.147 The detainee cases wound their way through the fed-
eral courts 148 until June 2004, when the Supreme Court decided in Rasul
v. Bush that the Guantdnamo detainees had a right to contest their deten-
tion in federal court. 149 Although Rasul, decided by a vote of six to three,
concluded that Guantinamo detainees had a statutory right to file habeas
petitions, the Court did not address whether this right was merely statu-
tory rather than constitutional and, therefore, subject to valid elimination
by Congress. 150
142. See Congressional Hearings on Military Commissions, available at http://www.cnss.
org/militarytribunals.htm.
143. Robin Toner, Political Memo; Few in Congress Questioning President Over Civil
Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al.
144. A few members of Congress claimed to have expressed interest in crafting legisla-
tion to govern post-September 11 detention issues. Senator Specter, for instance, stated
that he broached the idea of introducing legislation governing detainee treatment in con-
versations with the Bush administration in early 2002 but was rebuffed. Kate Zernike, A
Top Senate Republican is Uncertain on Legislation for Military Tribunals for Terror Sus-
pects, N.Y. TiMES, July 1, 2006, at A10.
145. Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Suit to be Filed on Behalf of Three
Detainees in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at Al.
146. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472 (2004).
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473.
148. See Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 352 F.3d 1278
(9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2002), affd sub nom., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
149. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
150. Id. at 478. In his Boumediene concurrence, Justice Souter, joined by Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg, argued that Rasul was not ambiguous as regards the applicability of
constitutional-not just statutory-habeas jurisdiction to detainees at Guantdnamo.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2278 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[N]o one who
reads the Court's opinion in Rasul could seriously doubt that the jurisdictional question
must be answered the same way in purely constitutional cases .. "). As Justice Scalia
correctly pointed out in his Boumediene dissent, however, Rasul was devoted primarily to
explaining why the statutory predicate for the Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950),
decision was no longer valid, and did not expressly focus on the question of constitutional




The Rasul Court also did not explain the extent of review and relief to
which detainees were entitled by virtue of their habeas petitions. As
Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have explained, habeas ju-
risdiction functions like an "on-off" switch: while "[t]he meaning of the
'off' position is clear: the petition must be dismissed," "the meaning of
the 'on' position can vary greatly: review can range from de novo judicial
decision of all pertinent questions of fact and law to a highly deferential
inquiry into only some aspects of [detention]. '151 Rasul simply decided
that the habeas switch was "on" for Guantanamo detainees in federal
court based on a federal statute. Rasul distinguished the Court's 1950
decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,152 which held that federal courts'
habeas jurisdiction did not extend to twenty-one Germans accused of war
crimes held at a United States military prison in Germany after World
War II, primarily on the basis of intervening decisions changing the
Court's interpretation of the federal habeas statute.1 53 Notwithstanding
one cryptic footnote that some observers read as supporting the validity
of the detainees' substantive-as opposed to jurisdictional-claims, 154
the Rasul majority opinion did not clearly articulate the scope of habeas
review in which the lower courts should engage, or whether the detainees
could validly assert rights under the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, or
treaties.
As a result of Rasul's ambiguity, lower courts subsequently disagreed
as to what, exactly, Rasul guaranteed the Guantdnamo detainees. 155
Some courts looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld,156 a case decided the same day as Rasul, for help. 157 Like Rasul,
Hamdi addressed the question of whether a detainee caught in Afghani-
stan-Yaser Hamdi, an alleged affiliate of the Taliban-could challenge
his detention by petitioning a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.
Unlike the Rasul detainees, however, Hamdi was an American citizen.
Despite his citizenship, the Bush administration sought to dismiss
Hamdi's habeas petition, arguing that President Bush had the authority
to detain even an American citizen who was caught engaging in hostilities
against the United States in Afghanistan.158 Eight justices of the Su-
preme Court disagreed with the Bush administration, with the controlling
151. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2049 (2007).
152. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
153. 542 U.S. at 475-79.
154. Id. at 483 n.15.
155. Compare Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320-21 (D.D.C. 2005) (Rasul as "on"
switch to nothing), with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463
(D.D.C. 2005) (Rasul as "on" switch to meaningful review of custody).
156. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
157. E.g., In re Guantgnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465 (D.D.C. 2005).
158. Although it sought to have Hamdi's petition dismissed on the merits, the Bush
administration conceded that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear Hamdi's habeas
petition. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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majority of six justices 159 concluding that Hamdi was entitled under the
Fifth Amendment to "a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's fac-
tual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."'1 60 Although Justices
Scalia and Stevens argued in dissent that, in the absence of a suspension
of habeas corpus by Congress, which had not occurred, the government
was compelled either to try Hamdi in the criminal courts or release
him,161 the controlling majority required only that Hamdi be given "some
system" for refuting his classification as an "enemy combatant" before a
neutral decisionmaker, 162 even if that system, unlike the criminal justice
system, were to rely on hearsay evidence and a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the government's allegations. 163
By its own language, the holding in Hamdi applied only to "citizen de-
tainee[s]."'1 64 Nonetheless, the Bush administration sought to comply
with what it perceived to be Hamdi's dictates by establishing a formal
legal process for assessing whether all detainees at Guant~namo, citizens
or not, were "enemy combatants."'1 65 Through executive order and ad-
ministrative regulations, the Bush administration created the military-run
Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRTs"), which offered Guantd-
namo detainees the chance to contest their designation as "enemy com-
batants" before a supposedly neutral decisionmaker. 166  Despite
purporting to comply with Hamdi's notions of what minimum due pro-
cess must be afforded to detainees, many lawyers and legal scholars
harshly criticized the CSRTs as not even meeting that rather low bar.' 67
Specifically, the CSRTs were attacked as shrouded in secrecy, denying
detainees the ability to hear and contest much of the evidence against
them.1 68 Most detainees did not have legal counsel during their proceed-
ings. 169 Moreover, the government frequently sought rehearings for de-
tainees who were initially found not to be "enemy combatants,"
submitting the determination to a differently constituted panel of hearing
officers in order to obtain a favorable result.' 70
159. Justices Souter and Ginsburg largely disagreed with the approach taken in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, which carried four Justices including O'Connor, but none-
theless signed on to the plurality's judgment in order to give the Court a majority. Id. at
553-54.
160. Id. at 533.
161. Id. at 563-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 535, 537.
163. Id. at 533-34.
164. Id. at 533.
165. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowiz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy,
July 7, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
166. Id.
167. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 151, at 2100 & n.286.
168. Id. at 2100 n.286 (explaining that only the Tribunal has access to the evidence used
as a basis for determining enemy combatant status and that although the detainee may call
witnesses, the Tribunal determines whether they are "reasonably available").
169. Id. at 2 (explaining that detainees are provided only with a nonlawyer "personal
representative" as of right).
170. William Glaberson, Military Insider Becomes Critic of Hearings at Guantanamo,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at Al.
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Even if the CSRTs were hardly a paradigm of "due process," Hamdi,
perhaps backhandedly, nonetheless spurred the executive to provide
some process to noncitizen detainees held at Guantinamo.17 t Hamdi,
however, spurred only the executive to act unilaterally; the Court did not
require Congress and the executive to work together to pass legislation
establishing a new regime for detaining terrorist suspects. Although
Hamdi and Rasul were nominal defeats for the Bush administration,
neither of the decisions, at least initially, spurred any action by Con-
gress. 172 Rather, the result of Hamdi was, paradoxically, even more
power in executive hands, at least as compared to Congress.173
In the wake of Rasul, the number of Guantdinamo detainees filing peti-
tions for habeas corpus review of their detentions soared. 174 Although
Rasul had left undecided the scope of the detainees' habeas review, it at
least offered the detainees some chance for review of their detentions in
federal court, a forum more likely to be neutral than a CSRT convened
by the military. 17 5 The Bush administration fought back vigorously
against the flood of post-Rasul habeas petitions on two fronts: in the
courts and on Capitol Hill. In the courts, the Bush administration argued
that Rasul was simply an "on" switch to nothing, since the detainees had
no constitutional, statutory, or treaty rights upon which to rely.1 76 On
Capitol Hill, the administration and its allies sought to take advantage of
171. Even before Hamdi, the government had ceased sending citizen-detainees to
Guant~namo. Nonetheless, the Bush administration did not relent from the position that it
had the authority to label American citizens as "enemy combatants" and detain them
outside of the criminal justice system, even when captured on American soil, as in the case
of Jose Padilla. The Supreme Court ducked answering squarely the question of whether
Padilla's detention was authorized in its initial consideration of his habeas petition, decid-
ing instead that Padilla had filed his petition in the wrong district court. Rumsfeld v. Pa-
dilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Although the Fourth Circuit subsequently held that Padilla's
detention was legal, Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), the government's ulti-
mate decision to prosecute Padilla in the civilian criminal courts while his petition for certi-
orari was pending allowed the Supreme Court to avoid deciding the question of the
President's authority to detain American citizens apprehended in the United States as "en-
emy combatants." See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006) (granting United States' ap-
plication to transfer Padilla from military custody to the federal prisons), rev'g Padilla v.
Hanft, 432 F.3d 583, 585 (4th Cir. 2005) (refusing to grant government permission to trans-
fer Padilla from military to civilian custody because of "appearance that" the government
was trying "to avoid consideration of [Fourth Circuit's Padilla] decision by the Supreme
Court").
172. In her plurality opinion in Hamdi, Justice O'Connor did note that "when individ-
ual liberties are at stake," the Constitution "assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches" of the federal government. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). Some
commentators read into this line a clear invitation to Congress to collaborate with the
President on a plan for detainees. See Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, THE NEW
YORKER, Dec. 4, 2007, at 46. If Justice O'Connor meant her comment as an invitation to
Congress, Congress was slow to respond.
173. Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese In-
ternment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 307, 384 (2006).
174. By November 2005, nearly 200 of the 500 detainees at Guantanamo had filed
habeas petitions. Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at Al.
175. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2260 (2008).




Rasul's apparent statutory-rather than constitutional-basis by amend-
ing the habeas statute to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions brought by "enemy combatants. 1 7 7  This effort
culminated in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"). 178
In addition to addressing a number of other issues regarding detainee
treatment,179 the DTA sought to establish judicial procedures by which
the CSRT determinations could be reviewed. In particular, the Act gave
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
"exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final determina-
tion of" a CSRT regarding an alien's designation as an "enemy combat-
ant." 180 After much legislative wrangling, 81 the Act also amended the
general habeas statute-28 U.S.C. § 2241-in a manner that appeared to
at least restrict, if not eliminate, the availability of habeas relief to alien
detainees at Guantinamo. 182 Specifically, the DTA amended the general
habeas statute to require that "no court, justice, or judge shall have juris-
diction to hear or consider ... an application for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense
at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. '183 While it appeared reasonably clear from
this language that the Act prevented Guantdnamo detainees from filing
new habeas petitions, it was less clear whether the DTA eliminated the
federal courts' jurisdiction over the nearly 200 habeas claims of detainees
then pending. Some senators who voted for the DTA-namely, Lindsey
Graham and John Kyl-firmly believed that they were voting for a com-
plete elimination of habeas for Guantinamo detainees, 184 while others,
177. Schmitt, supra note 174.
178. Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified in scattered sections of
10, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
179. For instance, the DTA included the "McCain Amendment," so named for Senator
John McCain of Arizona, which required that all prisoners in Department of Defense cus-
tody be treated uniformly according to the Army Field Manual. DTA § 1002 (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 801). The Act banned cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees,
DTA § 1003 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd), while also immunizing military and other
governmental personnel from lawsuits and criminal prosecution for acts performed while
interrogating detainees pursuant to official orders. DTA § 1004 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000dd-1).
180. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat. at 2742. In reviewing CSRT determinations, the
DTA required that the D.C. Circuit limit its consideration to whether the CSRT abided by
Department of Defense regulations and whether the determination is "consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States," "to the extent ... applicable." DTA
§ 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 2742.
181. Senator Lindsey Graham's initial proposal, which was passed by the Senate, but
not the House, on November 10, 2005, would have amended the general habeas statute to
read: "No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien outside the United States ...
who is detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." Graham
Amendment on Detainee Judicial Review, JURIsT-GAZETrE, Nov. 10, 2005, http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/gazette/2005/11/graham-amendment-on-detainee-judicial.php.
182. DTA § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2742.
183. Id.
184. E.g., 151 Cong. Rec. S14256-01, S14262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham); see also Brief of Senators Graham and Kyl as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 16-20, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184); Statement
on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Ad-
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such as Carl Levin, voted for the DTA with the belief that it did not apply
to pending claims.1 85 Perhaps because of its ambiguity on this point,1 86
this compromise version of the DTA's habeas-limiting provision passed
the Senate by a vote of 84 to 14 before being incorporated into the DTA's
final version.18 7
A. HAMDAN AND ITS AFTERMATH
Within seven months, the Supreme Court settled the question of the
DTA's habeas-stripping scope in Hamdan, with the majority siding with
Senator Levin's view that the Act did not strip the federal courts of juris-
diction over pending claims of Guantinamo detainees. 188 Hamdan in-
volved a habeas petition brought by Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni
national held at Guantdnamo since June 2002. The military accused
Hamdan of being the personal driver to al Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden 189 and sought to try him through the system of military commis-
sions that President Bush established in November 2001.190 Hamdan
contested the legality of the military commissions system through his
habeas action. In deciding Hamdan's case, the Supreme Court ruled, five
to three, that the President did not have the authority to unilaterally es-
tablish a military commissions system to try detainees. 19 1 Hamdan did
not raise, and the Court did not consider, whether Hamdan's continued
detention-even in the absence of trial by military commission-was le-
gally justified. 192
In rejecting the Bush administration's claims of authority to establish
military commissions, the majority and concurring opinions in Hamdan
highlighted the lack of clear congressional authorization for such a sys-
tem.1 93 For instance, in his brief concurrence, Justice Breyer noted that
although "Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to
create military commissions," "[n]othing prevents the President from re-
turning to Congress to seek the authority he believes is necessary. '194
Justice Breyer stressed that the Court was "plac[ing] its faith" in
dress Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005) (indicating that the President believed that the
DTA cut off all detainee habeas cases, pending or not, in federal court).
185. 151 Cong. Rec. S14257 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin) (citing
"effective date" provision of statute, § 1005(h), as support for habeas limitations not apply-
ing to pending claims).
186. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Dis-
orders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV.
627, 628 (2002) (arguing that legislators use ambiguous statutory language susceptible to
inconsistent interpretations to gain support for the statute).
187. 151 Cong. Rec. S.12777-02, S12803 (daily ed. November 15, 2005).
188. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The Court did not decide the ques-
tion of whether the Act applied to future habeas petitions. Id. at 2764.
189. Id. at 2761.
190. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
191. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793.
192. Id. at 2798.
193. Id. at 2775, 2779, 2798.
194. Id. at 2799.
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America's democratic institutions to fashion a system for trying detainees
that would comport with constitutional standards.195 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy, relying heavily on Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel
Seizure case, noted that the President had acted "in a field with a history
of congressional participation and regulation" that limited the President's
powers. 196 While the President lacked authority to establish military
commissions through executive order in the face of this congressional ac-
tion, Congress nonetheless had the "power and prerogative" to "change
the controlling statutes" to authorize what the President had done, Justice
Kennedy wrote. 197
The Court's decision in Hamdan elicited a flurry of reactions from poli-
ticians, lawyers, and legal scholars. Opponents of the Bush administra-
tion's detention policies hailed the Court's decision as a complete
repudiation.198 Senator Patrick Leahy, for instance, a vocal critic of the
Bush administration's detention policies, praised the ruling as a "triumph
for our constitutional system of checks and balances."'199 While many
commentators focused on the fact that the Court had ruled against the
Bush administration's aggressive assertions of power in the "war on ter-
ror," other commentators specifically praised the Court for its "democ-
racy-forcing" approach. 200 Rather than foreclose any options to the
political branches for dealing with terrorist suspects, as a ruling based
more on substantive constitutional rights would have done, the Court's
Hamdan decision "place[d] its faith" in the country's democratic institu-
tions-namely, the President and Congress-to fashion a system for try-
ing terrorist suspects.201
The Court's apparent invitation to Congress in Hamdan was un-
characteristic for a Court that had so jealously guarded its authority over
constitutional interpretation, particularly under Chief Justice Rehn-
quist.202 Moreover, the Court, seemingly aware of what it had long rec-
ognized as its decreased institutional legitimacy in the national-security
context and likely frustrated by Congress' relative docility in the face of
an extremely aggressive executive branch, appeared to embrace the idea
that the best way to restrain an aggressive executive was to remind Con-
gress of its important role in defining the limits of executive power. In
195. Id. ("The Constitution places its faith in ... democratic means. Our Court today
simply does the same.").
196. Id. at 2800-01.
197. Id. at 2800. Justice Kennedy did note that whatever system Congress and the Pres-
ident ultimately adopted after "due consideration" would have to be "in conformance with
Constitution and other laws." Id.
198. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at Al.
199. Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Reaction of Sen. Patrick
Leahy on Supreme Court's Decision in Hamdan Case, June 30, 2006, http://leahy.senate.
gov/press/200606/062906.html (calling decision a "triumph for our constitutional system of
checks and balances").
200. E.g., Balkin, supra note 10.
201. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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this sense, Hamdan represented a marked shift even from Hamdi, which
just two years earlier had not called for increased legislative involvement
in setting rules for detaining terrorist suspects. Whereas Hamdi had sim-
ply imposed judicially bounded mandates on the executive, Hamdan ap-
peared to be an invitation-if not a prod-to Congress to involve itself in
setting the rules for detainees.
The Supreme Court decided Hamdan a little more than four months
before the November 2006 midterm congressional elections. The im-
pending elections placed additional pressure on Congress to address the
detainee issues Hamdan placed squarely in the political sphere. By the
summer of 2006, Democrats, the minority party in both the House and
Senate, sensed a chance to make substantial gains, and perhaps even take
over one or both houses of Congress, in the November 2006 elections in
light of public dissatisfaction with the Bush administration's handling of
the war in Iraq and Hurricane Katrina.20 3 Nonetheless, Democrats
feared that Republicans would paint them as "soft" on terrorism, as
Republicans had done so successfully in the two national elections after
the September 11 attacks. In 2002, Republicans used national security
issues to pad their majority in the House of Representatives and retake
control of the Senate, overcoming historical odds against a president's
party gaining seats midway through his first term.20 4 In 2004, President
Bush, en route to re-election, and his surrogates ruthlessly attacked the
Democratic nominee, Senator John Kerry, as weak on national secur-
ity.20 5 Republicans also gained seats in both the House and Senate in the
2004 elections, in part due to a campaign focused on national security. 206
The Congress in which the Hamdan Court "place[d] its faith," therefore,
comprised a majority of the same party as the President and a minority
terrified of doing anything that might be characterized as "soft" on
terrorism.20 7
203. Neal Devins, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy Combatants: How
Lawmakers Buoyed Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1562, 1589 (2007).
204. Robin Toner & Carl Hulse, The 2002 Election: Congress; By Acquiring Full Con-
trol of the Congress, Republicans Gained New Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at
A28. Specifically, Republican candidates attacked Democrats on two national security-
related issues: the looming invasion of Iraq, which Democrats were accused of opposing or
not supporting with sufficient zeal, see Jide Nzelibe, Are Congressionally Authorized Wars
Perverse?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 907, 928-29 (2007), and the creation of a Department of
Homeland Security, which Democrats were accused of obstructing in order to ensure
union and civil-service protections for its employees. Carl Hulse & David Firestone, Sen-
ate Follows House on the Road Out of Washington and Plans to Return on Nov. 12, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at A29.
205. Mark Danner, How Bush Really Won, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 13, 2005, at 48.
206. Carl Hulse, Bigger Republican Majority Plans to Push Bush Agenda, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2005, at A16.
207. See infra note 219.
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MCA
If the Hamdan majority's process-based objections to the presidentially
established military commission system were merely cover for more sub-
stantive objections, the Bush administration sought to call the Court's
bluff, and quickly. Soon after Hamdan, administration officials began
urging Congress to provide the President with the very authority that the
Court in Hamdan said he lacked-but could obtain from Congress-to
establish a military commission system that would differ only slightly
from the system established by executive order in 2001.208 Despite the
initial objections of some Republicans, many Democrats, 20 9 and top ca-
reer military lawyers210 to approving a military commission, rather than
court-martial, system for trying terrorist suspects, the Bush administra-
tion's Republican allies in the House of Representatives quickly intro-
duced legislation similar to the President's proposal in the summer
months of 2006.211 In addition to establishing military commissions, the
House bill, consistent with Bush administration desires, stripped federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of all Guantinamo detainees,
allowed the commissions to use classified evidence not disclosed to de-
fendants, and weakened Geneva Convention protections. 21 2 Republican
Representative Duncan Hunter of California, the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee that was responsible for drafting the military com-
missions bill in the House, accurately summed up House Republicans'
reaction to Hamdan when he stated flatly that they would "do what the
President wants. '213
Despite also being under Republican control, the Senate, by contrast,
opposed some aspects of the President's proposal. In particular, three
prominent Republican senators with reputations for expertise and credi-
208. Kate Zernike, Administration Prods Congress to Curb Detainee Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2006, at Al.
209. David S. Cloud & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Rules Debated for Trials of Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A20; Zernike, supra note 208, at Al; Kate Zernike & Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Detainee Rights Create a Divide on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at Al.
210. David S. Cloud & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Bill Proposes System to Try
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at Al.
211. The House Armed Services Committee approved military commissions legislation
similar to President Bush's proposal on September 13, 2006, by vote of 52 to 8. Alexis
Unkovic, Conflicting Military Commissions Bills Moving Through Congressional Commit-
tees, JURIST, Sept. 13, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/09/con-
flicting-military-commissions-bills.php; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary,
President Meets with House Republican Conference at the U.S. Capitol (Sept. 14, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/2006/09/20060914-4.html (thanking the House
for moving President Bush's legislation forward). The House Judiciary Committee ap-
proved the same bill by a much closer vote, 20 to 19, with all seventeen Democrats who
took part in the voting opposing the bill, along with two Republicans. Katerina Ossenova,
House Judiciary Committee Approves Military Commissions Bill after Killing It, JURIST,
Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006-09-21-indexarch.php#
115885112651242297.
212. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
213. Kate Zernike, Rebuff for Bush on How to Treat Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2006, at Al
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bility on military matters-Senators John Warner, John McCain, and
Lindsey Graham ("the Warner group")-pushed a rival military commis-
sions bill that provided stronger protections for detainees than the admin-
istration's and House's proposals, although it too eliminated habeas
jurisdiction for detainees. 214 On September 14, 2006, the Senate Armed
Services Committee, chaired by Senator Warner, passed the rival bill. 21 5
Despite objecting to its elimination of habeas jurisdiction, some Armed
Services Committee Democrats voted for the bill in committee with the
hopes that the habeas-stripping provision could be altered or deleted
later on the Senate floor.216 The committee's passage of the rival bill
precipitated contentious negotiations between the administration and the
Warner group regarding the differences between the two camps.2 17 Al-
though Democrats constituted a filibuster-worthy caucus of forty-five in
the Senate2 18 and had provided most of the votes to push the Warner bill
out of committee, they were more than happy to let prominent Republi-
can senators lead the fight for greater detainee rights rather than do so
themselves and risk appearing soft on terrorism. Even though some
prominent Democrats had expressed major concerns about the potential
habeas-stripping provision, the Democratic leadership, in the words of
Minority Leader Reid, "s[at] on the sidelines" watching the "catfight"
between the Warner group and the Bush administration. 219 On Septem-
ber 22, the administration and the Warner group agreed to a compromise
bill that provided some increased protections for military commission de-
fendants, including allowing them to see all of the evidence used against
them. 220 The compromise, however, retained the provision that stripped
federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of noncitizen
enemy combatants. 221
It was not only Senate Democrats who expressed concern about the
stripping of habeas jurisdiction. Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of
Pennsylvania and chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, made clear to
214. Id.
215. Id.; S. 3901, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter "Warner Bill"]. In moving the bill
out of committee, Warner, Graham, and McCain were joined by one moderate Republican
Senator, Susan Collins of Maine, as well as the entire slate of the committee's Democrats
for a 15-9 vote. Zernike, supra note 213.
216. See, e.g., Press Release, Press Office of Senator Carl Levin, Statement of Senator
Carl Levin Regarding Mark-up of Military Commissions Bill (Sept. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=263067.
217. Kate Zernike & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Differences Settled in Deal Over Detainee
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2006, at A9.
218. The forty-five included Senator James Jeffords of Vermont, an Independent who
caucused with the Democratic minority.
219. Charles Hurt, McConnell: Democrats AWOL in Terror War, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2006, at A4; see also Zernike & Stolberg, supra note 217.
220. Id.; David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over
the Guantdnamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 175-76 (2008)
("Overall the MCA brings the commission process much closer to the judicial form of a
court-martial.")
221. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007)).
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his fellow senators that he considered any military commissions bill with a
habeas-stripping provision to be unconstitutional. Although the Senate
leadership did not refer the compromise bill to the Judiciary Committee,
as Senator Specter had requested, 222 Specter nonetheless held hearings
on the constitutionality of the proposed habeas-stripping language soon
after the Warner-Bush compromise had been brokered. At the hearings,
numerous witnesses testified that the bill's elimination of habeas rights
for detainees would exceed Congress's constitutional powers, and would
likely be invalidated by the Supreme Court.2 23 Senator Specter himself
observed during the hearing that if the compromise bill passed without
amendment, "the Supreme Court will teach Congress another lesson" by
invalidating the habeas-stripping provision.224 Specter and the ranking
Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy, indicated at the
hearing that they would seek to repeal the habeas-stripping provision
from the compromise bill when it reached the Senate floor.225
Meanwhile, the House of Representatives passed an altered version of
the Senate's compromise legislation on September 27, entitled the Mili-
tary Commissions Act. Just a couple of days before, House Republicans,
at the behest of the White House, re-drafted their version of the compro-
mise bill so as to make it easier for the executive to label noncitizens
"enemy combatants" subject to the military commission's jurisdiction. 226
In passing the Act, House Republican leadership beat back Democratic
attempts to preserve habeas corpus rights for Guantinamo detainees.22 7
During the floor debates regarding the Act, House Republicans made it
clear that they understood the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan to
be an invitation to Congress to establish a system for detaining and trying
detainees, and they believed that this legislation responded to the invita-
222. Press Release, Senator Arlen Specter, Senator Specter Speaks on the Senate Floor
Regarding Habeas Corpus (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://specter.senate.gov/public/in-
dex.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.ArlenSpecterSpeaks&ContentRecordid=647f90af-
71bf-4daa-baOO-d23e1002c9e3&Regionid=&Issue_Id.
223. E.g., Examining Proposals to Limit Guantanamo Detainees' Access to Habeas
Corpus Review: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 76-77 (2006)
(written testimony of Jonathan Hafetz).
224. Kate Zernike & Carl Hulse, Security and War Take Center Stage as Campaign
Break Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A16.
225. Examining Proposals to Limit Guantanamo Detainee's Access to Habeas Corpus
Review: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109-113 (2006), availa-
ble at http://bulk.resource.orggpo.gov/hearings/19s/30633.pdf (statements of Sens. Leahy
and Specter).
226. Specifically, the bill, which would become the final version of the MCA, defined
"unlawful enemy combatant" as "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has pur-
posefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belliger-
ents," 10 U.S.C. § 948a, whereas the Senate Armed Services Committee bill had defined
the term more narrowly to include only those "engaged in hostilities against the United
States." Warner Bill § 948(a), supra note 215. The revised House bill made other changes
to the Armed Services Committee bill, such as not allowing detainees to "examine and
respond to" all evidence against them and loosening the language restricting the use of
evidence obtained without a search warrant. Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike, Deal Is Likely on
Detainees but Not on Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at A20.
227. See 152 Cong. Rec. H7517 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
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tion.2 28 Moreover, despite Democrats' repeated objections that the bill's
stripping of detainees' habeas rights was unconstitutional and would in-
vite judicial invalidation,229 those House Republicans who spoke on the
floor indicated that they believed that the bill was constitutional and
would withstand court scrutiny.2 30 The bill passed the House 253-168,
with Republicans supporting it 219-7 and Democrats opposing it 160-
228. See, e.g., id. at H7511 (statement of Rep. Dreier) ("We are here working on this
legislation because ... [tjhe judicial branch directed Congress to establish procedures for
military commissions."); id. at H7514 (statement of Rep. Hunter) ("[The Supreme Court]
said that the President couldn't [set up military commissions] himself, that it had to be
participated in by Congress .... ").
229. See, e.g., id. at H7513 (statement of Rep. Skelton) ("[I]f you want to be tough on
terrorists, pass a statute that will meet the scrutiny of the Supreme Court .... "); id. at
H7514 (statement of Rep. Tauscher) ("We need a bill that is not going to be turned over by
the Supreme Court .... ); id. at H7515 (statement of Rep. Pelosi) ("[T]his bill ... does
violence to the Constitution of the United States .... "); see also 152 Cong. Rec. H7539
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Reyes): id. at H7541; id. at H7548 (statement
of Rep. Lofgren); id. at H7553 (statement of Rep. Levin) ("This [bill] will not pass consti-
tutional muster."); id. at H7555 (statement of Rep. Nadler) ("This bill is flatly unconstitu-
tional .... "); id. (statement of Rep. Lantos) ("I ... fully expect to be back debating these
issues when the Supreme Court overturns this ill-advised legislation."). All of the above-
cited objections to the bill were raised by opponents of the MCA; the Supreme Court has
largely ignored statements made by opponents when attempting to discern legislative in-
tent. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); but see Costello, supra
note 96, at 54.
230. Specifically, House Republican supporters of the MCA argued that any constitu-
tional right to habeas corpus was not available to noncitizen detainees held overseas (in-
cluding Guantgnamo Bay) and that Congress, therefore, had the authority to constrict the
statutory habeas corpus right. In making this argument, Republicans stressed that they
understood the holding of the Supreme Court's opinion in Rasul to be purely statutory
See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. H7513 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Lungren)
("We are not talking about the great writ that is found in the Constitution, the great writ of
habeas corpus. We are talking about a statutory writ, which the Supreme Court has said
time and time again Congress has the right to create, Congress has the right to restrict,
Congress has the right to eliminate."); 152 Cong. Rec. H7545 (statement of Rep. Sensen-
brenner) ("The Supreme Court has never, never held that the Constitution's protections,
including habeas corpus, extend to non-citizens held outside the United States."). Sup-
porters of the MCA also argued that even if habeas were constitutionally required for
noncitizen detainees held outside the United States, detainees already received an ade-
quate substitute for habeas through the judicial review provisions the DTA established for
CSRT determinations of "enemy combatant" status, which were preserved in the MCA.
See id. at H7540 (statement of Rep. Hunter) ("Every single person held in Guantanamo
has the right and will have the right under this legislation to contest whether or not they
are ... enemy combatants .... That, in my estimation, is an important type of habeas
corpus . . . preserved in this bill."); id. at H7545 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
("[T]his bill reflects Congress's statutory determination that [detainees] are entitled to ...
a full and fair review of the government's core decisions authorizing their detention by the
D.C. Circuit, a respected article 3 court."); 152 Cong. Rec. H7937 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Hunter).
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
34.231 In their zeal to "do what the President wants, '232 the House of
Representatives, dominated by the same party as the President, hardly
functioned as the check on executive power that the Hamdan Court
might have envisioned.233 Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the Republi-
can-led House passed the MCA with the intent that it survive judicial
scrutiny; in other words, for the vast majority of House members who
voted in its favor, the MCA was not an intentionally unconstitutional
law.2
34
The story in the Senate was quite different. Unlike the House, whose
procedural rules make it easy for the majority party to push through its
legislative priorities, the Senate's rules-particularly its filibuster rule-
give the minority party, or a minority on any particular legislative issue,
substantial power to thwart legislation. 235 In late September 2006, it ap-
peared that a substantial minority of the Senate had major constitutional
concerns regarding the stripping of habeas jurisdiction for detainees'
claims. As noted above, Senator Specter flatly stated that Section 7 of
the MCA, the habeas-stripping provision, was unconstitutional.236 Other
Democrats and some Republicans expressed similar reservations before
the bill reached the Senate floor on September 28, 2006.237 Given these
articulated concerns, one might have expected a credible filibuster threat
from the senators who believed that stripping habeas violated the Consti-
231. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 491, Sept. 27, 2006, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/
ro11491.xml [hereinafter, "Roll Call 491"]. Two days later, on September 29, 2006, the
House, for technical reasons, re-voted on the bill passed by the Senate on September 28,
despite the fact that the Senate's version of the bill was identical to the version voted on by
the House on September 27. 152 Cong. Rec. H7925-02, H-7949 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006)(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). The September 29 House vote was 250-170, with two
Democrats-Representatives Charlie Melancon of Louisiana and Michael Michaud of
Maine-switching their votes from "yeas" to "nays." Compare 152 Cong. Rec. H7959-01,
H7959 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006), with Roll Call 491, supra.
232. See Zernike, supra note 213.
233. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
234. Among the 253 supporters of the bill in the House, only one, Democratic Repre-
sentative Rob Andrews of New Jersey, publicly expressed "severe reservations" about thehabeas-stripping provision, which he considered constitutionally "ambiguous" and "not
very wise." 152 Cong. Rec. H7522-03, H7540 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006). Representative
Andrews expressed hope that the Senate would amend the bill to restore detainees' habeas
rights before final passage. Id. Despite the Senate's failure to restore such rights, Repre-
sentative Andrews still voted for the MCA when it returned to the House for a final, proforma vote on September 29. See Roll Call 491, supra note 231. At least one other Demo-
cratic Representative who voted for the Act-Sherrod Brown of Ohio, who was in the
midst of a hotly contested campaign for Senate-would later say that his vote for the MCA
was "wrong," a "bad vote," and a "mistake" due to the "heat of the campaign" that he
would "correct... when [the time] comes." Interview by Cenk Uygur with Sherrod Brown(June 18, 2007), http://www.theyoungturks.com/story/2007/6/18/203319/396; Progressive
Senators' Townhall-Take Back America 2007, June 19, 2007, available at http://video.
google.com/videoplay?docid-350640067067836268. After ultimately winning his Senate
election, Senator Brown voted in favor of restoring habeas rights to detainees when the
Senate reconsidered the issue in 2007. See 153 Cong. Rec. S11688-03, S11697 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 2007).
235. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 233, at 2372.
236. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
237. Zernike & Stolberg, supra note 217, at A9.
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tution. No filibuster threat emerged, however. Rather, despite decrying
the MCA on the Senate floor as "authoriz[ing] a vast expansion of the
President's power to detain people, even U.S. citizens, indefinitely and
without charge," 238 Senator Reid, the leader of the forty-five senate
Democrats, did nothing to stop its passage.239 Indeed, although he stated
that he "personally believe[d]" that the MCA "is unconstitutional" and
would "certainly be struck down by the Supreme Court in the years
ahead,"240 Reid had just a few days earlier ensured the Senate Republi-
can leadership that he would allow an up-or-down floor vote on the MCA
without the threat of a filibuster.241 As leader of a party with forty-five
votes, Reid stood as a potential "veto gate" to the MCA's passage.
Rather than attempt to pull together the forty-plus votes necessary to
stop the passage of legislation that he had publicly assailed as unconstitu-
tional, Reid let the bill proceed to an up-or-down vote.
242
Reid was not alone in facilitating the MCA's passage despite grave
constitutional reservations. During the Senate's floor debate of the
MCA, Senator Specter, as promised, offered an amendment to strike Sec-
tion 7.243 Specter argued forcefully for his amendment, claiming that its
passage was necessary to "retain[ing] the constitutional right of habeas
corpus" and preventing the rolling back of "basic rights by some 900
years. ' 244 Specter further warned that if his amendment did not pass and
the bill proceeded as written with its habeas-stripping clause, the Su-
preme Court would strike the provision down and Congress would have
to revisit the issue yet again.245 Numerous Democrats also argued that
238. 152 Cong. Rec. S10354-02, S10419 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Reid).
239. See Sebastian Mallaby, A Party Without Principles, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2006, at
A19 ("[I]f the Democrats had made common cause with the [MCA's] Republican oppo-
nents, they could have filibustered the president's bill. Why vote against something and
simultaneously allow it through?").
240. 152 Cong. Rec. S10354-02, S10419 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006).
241. U.S. Congress Passes President's Bill on Treatment and Trial of Terrorism Suspects;
Habeas Corpus Amendment Defeated, WORLD NEWS DIG., Sept. 28, 2006, at 741A1. In
exchange for the promise of no filibuster, the Democrats received from the Senate's Re-
publican leadership a promise that they would be allowed to offer four amendments on the
Senate floor, including an amendment to restore habeas rights to detainees. Id.
242. One might assert that Reid committed to an up-or-down vote gambling that the
Specter habeas-preserving amendment would pass, and that once the amendment failed,
he was obliged to keep his word. If so, this simply demonstrates that constitutional con-
cerns-even those of grave magnitude-are subject to legislative logrolling. See supra text
accompanying notes 93-95.
243. 152 Cong. Rec. S10263 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter).
244. Id. at S10264.
245. Id. at S10267. Shortly after the MCA's passage, the Washington Post reported that
Senator Specter had initially considered offering a more limited habeas-preserving amend-
ment that would have allowed Guantdnamo detainees to file only one habeas petition after
a year of detention but was pressured to pull that amendment in favor of a broader habeas-
preserving amendment because the Senate Republican leadership feared that the more
limited version might pass. Jeffrey Smith, Specter's Role in Passage of Detainee Bill Dis-
puted, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2006, at A19. Specter denied that he was pressured into aban-
doning the more limited amendment. Id. The Post reported that some Democratic
lobbyists and detainee lawyers were relieved that Specter's limited amendment was not
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Section 7 would be unconstitutional if enacted. 246 In addition to Senator
Specter, one other Republican, Senator Gordon Smith of Oregon, pub-
licly expressed constitutional concerns about the habeas-stripping provi-
sion, calling it "a frontal attack on our judiciary ... and civil-rights laws"
that "ought to trouble us all."'2 47 Despite these concerns, the Specter
amendment failed 51-48, with all but one of the Senate's forty-five Demo-
crats, Ben Nelson of Nebraska, voting in favor, joined by four Republi-
cans, including Smith and Specter.248 Of the forty-eight senators who
voted in favor of Specter's amendment, a total of fourteen (eleven Demo-
crats and three of the four Republicans who voted for the amendment)
would later vote for the MCA's final version. That final version of the
MCA, which stripped habeas, passed the Senate 65-34 on September 28,
2006, with fifty-three Republicans joined by twelve Democrats voting
"yea." Only one Republican-Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Is-
land-voted against the MCA. 249 The group of fourteen senators who
voted against the stripping of habeas but for the final bill included Sena-
tors Smith and Specter, both of whom had expressed grave doubts about
the constitutionality of Section 7 of the MCA.250 Indeed, Specter, just
offered and did not pass because a more limited habeas remedy would have been harder
for the Supreme Court ultimately to invalidate. Id.
246. 152 Cong. Rec. S10354-02, S10357, S10359 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statements of
Sen. Leahy) (decrying bill as "wrong" and "flagrantly unconstitutional" in part because of
its habeas-stripping provision); id. at S10360 (statement of Sen. Feingold) (The elimination
of habeas "for any alien detained by the United States, anywhere in the world ... almost
surely violates our Constitution."); id. at S10363 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("I do not
believe the bill before us is constitutional."); id. at S10365-66 (statement of Sen. Levin) ("If
we don't strike this court-stripping language in the bill before us... our expectation is that
the courts will find this provision to be a legislative excess and strike it down as unconstitu-
tional."); id. at S10366 (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("How can we, the U.S. Senate, in this bill
abolish habeas corpus by approving a provision that so clearly contravenes the text of the
Constitution?").
247. Id. at S10364.
248. Id. at S10369.
249. Chaffee also voted for the Specter amendment. Id.
250. The other twelve senators included Democrats Thomas Carper, Tim Johnson,
Mary Landrieu, Frank Lautenberg, Joseph Lieberman, Robert Menendez, Bill Nelson,
Mark Pryor, Jay Rockefeller, Ken Salazar, Debbie Stabenow, and Republican John
Sununu. Id. Of the eleven Democrats who voted for habeas preservation and for the bill,
five-Carper, Lieberman, Menendez, Nelson, and Stabenow-were up for re-election in
2006, and at least four of the five may have feared that a "nay" vote on the final version of
the bill would have been used against them in their campaigns by Republican opponents
attempting to paint them as soft on terror. See supra text accompanying notes 204 to 207.
Joe Lieberman is the one Democrat who likely did not fear this attack, as the main chal-
lenge to his incumbency came from the left in the guise of Ned Lamont, a Democrat who
had beaten Lieberman in the primary in August. Jennifer Medina, The Second Round
Begins for Lieberman and Lamont, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at B5. Indeed, among the
Democratic senators who were up for re-election in 2006, six of fourteen-or 43%-voted
in favor of the MCA, as opposed to just six of the thirty-one-or 19%-of Democratic
senators who were either in the middle of a term or retiring in 2006. Supra note 248. All
six of the Democratic senators who voted for the MCA and were up for re-election in 2006
won, as did all nine of the Democratic senators who voted against the MCA (Akaka, Bin-
gaman, Byrd, Cantwell, Clinton, Conrad, Feinstein, Kennedy, and Kohl). Id. Of the six
who voted for the MCA, five later voted, in September 2007 in the Democratic-controlled
Senate (and Congress), in favor of a filibustered bill that would have restored habeas
corpus to detainees. 153 Cong. Rec. S11688-03, S11697 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2007). The one
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before the vote on final passage of the bill, called the habeas-stripping
section "patently unconstitutional," yet he voted for the ultimate passage
of the MCA regardless. 251 Shortly after casting his vote, Senator Specter
expressed confidence to reporters that despite what he saw as the MCA's
grievous constitutional flaws, the courts would "clean it up."'2 52 Senator
Specter would later aid his hoped-for judicial cleanup by filing an amicus
brief arguing that the MCA's Section 7 was unconstitutional in the ensu-
ing Boumediene litigation before the Supreme Court.
25 3
Senators Specter and Smith were the only two among the group of
fourteen to publicly articulate their belief that at least the habeas-strip-
ping provision of the MCA was unconstitutional. Indeed, of the fourteen,
Specter and Smith were the only Senators to speak at all about the MCA
on the Senate floor. Nonetheless, it is highly likely that many, if not
most, of the other twelve senators shared Specter's and Smith's constitu-
tional doubt.254 Indeed, of the twelve senators who voted for the MCA
despite also voting for the failed Specter amendment, eleven later voted
in favor of a failed attempt to restore habeas rights to detainees during
the next session of Congress. Indeed, eight of those eleven-in addition
to Senator Specter-also sponsored the habeas restoration bill.255 It is
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that of the sixty-five "yea" votes for
the MCA, at least six-if not ten or more-cast their votes with the intent
that the MCA's habeas-stripping provision would be judicially invalidated
or transmogrified per Ashwander. As more than sixty votes are normally
required to clear the filibuster hurdle in the Senate, the failure of the
thirty-four "nay" votes to join forces with the six or more Senators who
exception was Senator Joe Lieberman, who by 2007 had become an "Independent Demo-
crat" after losing the Democratic primary nomination for Senate to Lamont. Id. Indeed,
all eleven of the remaining Democrats who voted in favor of the MCA later voted to
restore habeas to detainees; eight of them (Carper, Lautenberg, Menendez, Bill Nelson,
Pryor, Rockefeller, Salazar, and Stabenow) sponsored the legislation that would do so.
See Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007, S.185, 110th Cong. (2007).
251. Toobin, supra note 172, at 46.
252. See supra note 7.
253. See supra note 98.
254. On the other hand, it is clear that many of the proponents of the MCA voted in
favor of the bill with the hope and expectation that it would be upheld by the courts. E.g.,
152 Cong. Rec. S10243-01, S10245 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Warner)
("The goal of this legislation ... is first and foremost to meet the challenge for with-
standing review by the Supreme Court."); id. at S10252 (statement of Sen. Graham) ("I
bet you dollars to doughnuts when the Supreme Court gets hold of our work product they
are going to approve it."); see also id. at S10268 (statement of Sen. Kyl). In defending the
bill, many of its Republican supporters argued that the elimination of habeas rights for
noncitizen "enemy combatant" detainees was and ought to be constitutional, since nonci-
tizens had no constitutional habeas rights, see, e.g., id. at S10265 (statement of Sen.
Warner); id. at S10267 (statement of Sen. Kyl); 152 Cong. Rec. S10354-02, S10359 (Sept. 28,
2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions), and the detainees nonetheless received some judicial
review of their detention through the DTA's CSRT review provisions. See 152 Cong. Rec.
S10243-01, S10266 (Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Graham) ("[U]nder the Detainee
Treatment Act . . . every detainee at Guantanamo Bay will have their day in Federal
Court."); id. at S10268 (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also 152 Cong. Rec. S10354-02, S10361
(Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cornyn); id. at S10394 (statement of Sen. Graham).
255. See supra note 250.
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likely considered the habeas-stripping provision unconstitutional indi-
cates that at least Section 7 of the MCA was intentionally unconstitu-
tional. Applying the analysis discussed in Part II, the passage of the
MCA can be illustrated through the following chart, which excludes ref-
erence to filibustering since neither Minority Leader Reid, nor any indi-
vidual senator, attempted to filibuster:
Group Goal Means Vote on MCA
51-59 senators Strip Gitmo detainees of Vote for MCA and courts Yea
habeas uphold
6-14 senators Preserve habeas for Vote for MCA but courts Yea
detainees invalidate
34 senators2 5 6  Preserve habeas for Vote against MCA Nay
detainees
Additional evidence of the MCA's intentional unconstitutionality is the
failure of Senator Reid and other Democratic leaders who considered the
MCA unconstitutional to call for a filibuster on the bill, which allowed
the MCA to clear a crucial "veto gate." Indeed, Senator Reid's promise
not to filibuster likely increased the number of Democratic senators who
ultimately voted in favor of the MCA. Knowing that there was no filibus-
ter to sustain and that the Republicans could guarantee the fifty votes
needed for passage,257 many Democrats likely viewed a "yea" vote for
the MCA as relatively low-cost.258 These senators' confidence in the Su-
preme Court's eventual invalidation or transmogrification of the MCA's
habeas-stripping provision further lowered the cost they attached to a
"yea" vote. Indeed, in an article written shortly after the MCA's passage,
journalist Jeffrey Toobin quoted a Democratic Senate staffer as saying,
"[W]e make fun of Specter" for voting for the MCA despite objecting to
its habeas-stripping provision, "but we're basically leaving it up to the
Courts, too. '259 Although some commentators have described the MCA
as an example of the legislative process gone awry when the legislature is
controlled by the same party as the President,260 the Senate's filibuster
procedure gave the minority Democrats a tool by which to block undesir-
able legislation that enhanced the President's power. Reid's and the
Democrats' choice not to use this tool, therefore, is crucial to discerning
Congress' intent in passing the MCA.
256. The number of senators adds up to 99, rather than 100, because one senator,
Olympia Snowe of Maine, did not vote. 152 Cong. Rec. S10354-02, S10369 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 2006).
257. Because one Senator, Olympia Snowe of Maine, did not vote, only fifty votes were
required to pass. Id.
258. Cf. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
865, 906 (2007).
259. See Toobin, supra note 172, at 46.
260. See, e.g., Tung Yin, Tom and Jerry (and Spike): A Metaphor for Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, the President, the Court, and Congress in the War on Terrorism, 42 TULSA L. REV.
505, 535 (2007) (citing Levinson & Pildes, supra note 233).
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As discussed in Part II, a likely objection to this article's depiction of
the MCA as an intentionally unconstitutional act is that the views of sena-
tors like Specter and Smith should not trump the views of all the other
members of Congress who voted for the MCA with the publicly stated
belief that it is constitutional and should be upheld by the courts.
261
While this objection has some validity, at most it proves that Congress'
intent regarding the constitutionality of the MCA was ambiguous. Inso-
far as legislative intent always rests upon the extrapolation to a larger
group of the publicly stated views of some subset thereof, attributing to
the entire Congress opposition to the constitutionality of the MCA due to
the publicly stated concerns of a few key members of Congress is no
different.262
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF THE MCA'S
SECTION 7 IN BOUMEDIENE
If Hamdan succeeded in "forcing democracy," the outcome of that
democratic process disappointed those who hoped for a terrorist deten-
tion system that might better restrain executive discretion and protect
human rights. Despite Hamdan's apparent invitation, Congress appeared
eager to pass the task of constitutional interpretation right back to the
Supreme Court, and the Court is where the issue quickly went. Shortly
after the MCA's passage, Guantinamo detainees challenged Section 7 as
a violation of the Constitution's Suspension Clause.263 Because there was
no "rebellion or invasion," the detainees argued, Congress was without
power to suspend their right to seek habeas relief in federal court, as the
MCA purported to do. 2 64 Further, the detainees argued that insofar as
the DTA and MCA provided them with an opportunity to challenge
CSRT determinations in federal court,265 this review procedure did not
amount to the constitutionally required "adequate substitute" for the
habeas review that the MCA had withdrawn. 266 As compared to tradi-
tional habeas review, the detainees argued that the CSRTs and judicial
review thereof did not allow detainees to present their own evidence, did
not provide neutral and plenary review of the authority for detention,
unduly restricted the attorney-client relationship, were not speedy, and
did not specifically authorize the remedy of release. 267 The government,
on the other hand, responded that the detainees, as noncitizens held in a
territory over which the United States was not formally sovereign, had no
constitutional right to habeas. Even if the detainees had a right to
261. See supra note 230 and 254.
262. See supra notes 121 to 124 and accompanying text.
263. The detainees also argued that their indefinite detention facilitated by the MCA
violated their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Brief for the Petitioners at
44, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1196) [hereinafter Boumediene
Petitioners' Brief].
264. Id. at 9.
265. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
266. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
267. Boumediene Petitioners' Brief, supra note 263, at 27-32.
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habeas-the government argued, the CSRT's and judicial review thereof
through the DTA constituted an "adequate substitute" for habeas
review. 26
8
The first two rulings on the MCA's constitutionality-one from a fed-
eral district court in the remand of Hamdan's case and the other from the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in Boumediene v.
Bush-upheld Section 7.269 After initially declining to grant certiorari in
268. Brief for the Respondents at 14, 40, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)(Nos. 06-1195 and 06-1196).
269. The first ruling on the MCA came from Judge James Robertson of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2006 when considering
Hamdan's remanded habeas petition. Judge Robertson concluded that although the
MCA's stripping of habeas jurisdiction might be invalid as applied to those with a constitu-
tional right to habeas (such as American citizens), Hamdan, as a nonresident enemy alien
during a time of war, had no constitutional right to habeas corpus, and the MCA was
therefore valid as applied to him. Accordingly, Judge Robertson dismissed Hamdan's peti-
tion. Id. at 19. Two months later, in February 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of the MCA's Section 7 in an appeal of
habeas petitions filed by other Guantgnamo detainees. By a vote of two to one, the D.C.
Circuit concluded, in Boumediene v. Bush, that the MCA had validly repealed habeas juris-
diction from the federal courts over the detainees' claims. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The majority rejected as "nonsense" the detainees' semantics-based argument that the
MCA's habeas-stripping language was not sufficiently clear to strip the courts of jurisdic-
tion over their claims. Id. at 987. Rather, the majority stated that to accept the detainees'
arguments regarding habeas would be to "defy the will of Congress," id., citing numerous
members' statements supporting the proposition that the MCA intended to repeal habeas
rights from Guantinamo detainees. Id. at 986 n.2. The majority further concluded, like
Judge Robertson, that because the petitioners were nonresident aliens held outside of sov-
ereign United States territory, they had no constitutional right to habeas, and Congress'
alteration of the habeas statute was therefore valid. Id. at 991-94. Judge Judith Rogers, in
dissent, agreed with the majority that Congress, through the MCA, had intended to de-
prive the courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of Guantdnamo detainees. Id. at 999.
Unlike the majority, however, Judge Rogers asserted that the detainees need not show a
personal, constitutional "right" to habeas to prove a constitutional violation. According to
Judge Rogers, the Suspension Clause, unlike the Bill of Rights, did not provide rights to a
class of persons; rather, it operated as a limitation on Congress' powers. Id. at 997-98.
Further, Judge Rogers read the limited historical evidence and Rasul as indicating that the
constitutional writ of habeas extended to Guantinamo detainees. Id. at 1002-04. Because
Congress had withdrawn jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas claims through the MCA
without providing "an adequate alternative procedure for challenging detention" (Judge
Rogers viewed the CSRTs and judicial review thereof as inadequate, id. at 1004-07), and
not during a "rebellion" or "invasion," the MCA exceeded the powers of Congress. Id. at
1007.
One other federal court addressed the MCA's Section 7 before the Supreme Court de-
cided Boumediene, but not in a manner that required addressing the statute's constitution-
ality. In al-Marri v. Wright, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought
by a resident alien who had been declared an "enemy combatant" by President Bush and
placed in military custody on a naval brig in South Carolina. 487 F.3d 160, 163-64 (4th Cir.
2007). Although the government argued that the MCA proscribed jurisdiction over al-
Marri's petition, the panel disagreed, ruling that the MCA was inapplicable to the peti-
tioner because he was not "awaiting" a determination of combatant status by a CSRT. Id.
at 169. The Fourth Circuit subsequently heard the case en banc and issued its ruling shortly
after the Supreme Court decided Boumediene. Boumediene's invalidation of the MCA's
Section 7 negated the government's argument that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction
over al-Marri's claim. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, No. 06-7427, 2008 WL 2736787, at *1 n.*(4th Cir. July 15, 2008) (per curiam). In a highly fractured ruling, the Fourth Circuit held
that if the government's allegations were true regarding al-Marri's terrorist plans and affili-
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Boumediene,270 the Supreme Court reversed course and heard the case at
the beginning of its October 2007 term.271 As expected due to the case's
significance, the Court did not issue its decision until near the end of its
term on June 12, 2008. In a five-to-four ruling, the Court invalidated the
MCA's Section 7, holding that the detainees at Guantinamo have a con-
stitutional right to habeas corpus that Congress cannot take away without
providing an "adequate substitute," at least in the absence of a formal
suspension of the writ, which the Court said the MCA was not.272
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy recognized that the question
of whether aliens held as alleged enemy combatants at Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba, an area over which the United States does not exercise formal sov-
ereignty, had a constitutional right to habeas corpus was a novel one with
no clear answer in the common-law tradition.273 Rather than recognize
this question as a constitutional gray area or quasi-political question in
which the input of Congress might be useful, however, Justice Kennedy
firmly rejected the notion that the case presented a "political question" 274
and emphatically re-asserted the Court's ultimate-and seemingly exclu-
sive-prerogative to "say 'what the law is.' 275 To that end, the majority
retroactively limited Hamdan's seemingly broad invitation to Congress to
craft a constitutional system for detaining and trying terrorists,2 76 re-read-
ing it as inviting Congress only to provide authority for military commis-
sions and expressly rejecting the idea that Hamdan had authorized or
encouraged Congress to tinker with habeas as well.27 7 In their dissents,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia sharply criticized the majority for
this revisionist view of Hamdan.278
Proceeding from the standpoint that the case presented an issue best
left to the judiciary to decide, the Boumediene majority drew heavily on
the Insular Cases, a series of opinions from the early twentieth century
holding that the Constitution applied at least in part to territories the
ation with al Qaeda, the President had authority to detain him as an enemy combatant. Id.
at *1. The court also held, however, that al-Marri was entitled to further process on re-
mand to the district court to contest the government's allegations. Id.
270. 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007) (denying cert.).
271. 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007) (vacating order denying cert., granting cert.).
272. Boumediene v Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2272 (2008).
273. Id. at 2248-49 (noting that "[d]iligent search by all parties [regarding whether, at
common law, the writ of habeas corpus ran to territories over which the British monarch
was not sovereign] reveals no certain conclusions" and that historical evidence as to geo-
graphic scope of the writ at common law is "informative, but not dispositive"); id. at 2251
("We decline . . . to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical
evidence on point."); id. at 2262 ("[T]he cases before us lack any precise historical
parallel.").
274. Id. at 2253.
275. Id. at 2259 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 131, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
276. See supra notes 193 to 195 and accompanying text.
277. Id. at 2242.
278. Id. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Congress ... has been unceremoniously
brushed aside.") (citing Breyer's Hamdan concurrence); id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting extensively from Justice Breyer's Hamdan concurrence and then concluding




United States had acquired after the Spanish-American War.279 Relying
on the Insular Cases, the majority rejected a "categorical or formal con-
ception of sovereignty" in favor of a more functional, "de facto" test for
whether aliens detained at Guantariamo might enjoy constitutional
rights.280 Using this functional, fact-based test, the Court concluded that
the Suspension Clause "has full effect at Guantanamo Bay" due to the
United States' "absolute," "constant," and "indefinite" control of the
area.
281
Having concluded that the Suspension Clause applies at Guantinamo,
the majority proceeded to address whether the CSRT review procedure
established by the DTA amounted to an "adequate substitute" for the
statutory habeas rights Congress sought to eliminate through the MCA's
Section 7. The Court's precedents indicated that Congress' removal of
habeas jurisdiction did not necessarily present a Suspension Clause prob-
lem so long as Congress provided an "adequate substitute" therefor.2
82
The majority, however, ruled that the procedure provided under the
DTA was an inadequate substitute for habeas for a variety of reasons.
Justice Kennedy's opinion faulted the CSRTs for "constrain[ing] ... the
detainee's ability to rebut the factual basis for the Government's asser-
tion that he is an enemy combatant" because the detainee is not repre-
sented by counsel. 283 It also criticized the CSRTs for not allowing
detainees to see the classified evidence used against them and allowing
detainees to remain imprisoned on the basis of hearsay evidence that
need only be "relevant and helpful" to be admitted.284 The majority then
concluded that the DTA's provision of D.C. Circuit review of CSRT de-
terminations failed to cure these defects in large part because the DTA
did not expressly provide any mechanism for a detainee to present excul-
patory evidence to the D.C. Circuit that had not yet been presented
279. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Arm-
strong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
280. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
281. Id. at 2260. The Court distinguished GuantAnamo from the Landsberg Prison at
which the petitioners in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), were held by United
States forces after World War II on a number of bases, including the fact that the latter was
a "transient possession" under the jurisdiction of the combined Allied Forces, not just the
United States. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that whereas the naval base at Guantdnamo
Bay is "isolated and heavily fortified," Landsberg Prison was a less secure location in the
midst of "an occupation zone encompassing over 57,000 square miles with a population of
18 million." Id. at 2261. Further, the Court distinguished Eisentrager on the basis that the
petitioners there had apparently conceded their enemy combatant status and had received
a trial by military commission shortly after their capture, id. at 2259; in contrast, many of
the Guantlnamo detainees had been imprisoned for more than six years and none had yet
been tried for, much less charged with, war crimes. Id.
282. Id. at 2264 (citing Swain v. Presley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), and United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)).
283. Id. at 2260, 2269.
284. Id. at 2269 ("[G]iven that there are in effect no limits on the admission of hearsay




before a CSRT.2 85 Although the government had argued that a detainee
in possession of new, exculpatory information could ask the military to
convene a new CSRT,286 the majority was unsatisfied because, Justice
Kennedy wrote, the decision to convene a new CSRT was within the ex-
ecutive branch's unreviewable discretion.2 87
Pervading the Boumediene majority's opinion is a steadfast refusal to
use Ashwander aggressively, much less at all, to remedy the defects in the
CSRT-DTA scheme so as to find the MCA constitutional. Noting ob-
liquely that "[t]he usual presumption is that Members of Congress, in ac-
cord with their oath of office" legislate constitutionally, 288 the majority
then stated that "the canon of constitutional avoidance does not supplant
traditional modes of statutory interpretation, 2 89 despite the fact that on
many occasions, especially in recent cases involving habeas corpus, it
has. 290 Using non-Ashwander, "traditional" methods of statutory inter-
pretation, the majority thought it abundantly clear that Congress' intent
in passing the DTA and, later, the MCA, was to provide something less
than the process provided by habeas corpus. Hence, the majority refused
to read the DTA in a manner that would make its review procedure an
"adequate substitute" for the habeas relief the MCA withdrew.291 As
Chief Justice Roberts noted in his dissent, the majority decided that "any
interpretation of the [DTA] that would make it an adequate substitute for
habeas must be rejected, because Congress could not possibly have in-
tended to enact an adequate substitute for habeas. '29 2 Although Chief
Justice Roberts intended his observation as a wry critique, the majority's
decision is actually defensible from the standpoint of following Congress'
intent, since Congress passed the MCA despite many crucial members'
publicly stated beliefs that eliminating habeas for Guantinamo detainees
285. Id. at 2272-73.
286. Id. at 2273.
287. Id. at 2274 ("[W]e see no way to construe the DTA to allow a detainee to chal-
lenge the Deputy Secretary's [of Defense] decision not to open a new CSRT....
288. Id. at 2243 (emphasis added).
289. Id. at 2271 (noting that "[w]e cannot ignore the text and purpose of a statute in
order to save it").
290. In Zadvydas v. Davis, for example, a five-to-four majority of the Court read a
presumptive six-month limit on the detention of certain deportable aliens into a statute
that contained no such limitation in its text, relying heavily on the Ashwander canon. 533
U.S. 678, 701 (2001). The Court's aggressive statutory interpretation in Zadvydas was criti-
cized as inconsistent with congressional intent and "disingenuous" by Justice Scalia in his
dissent. Id. at 707. The same five-to-four majority also used Ashwander in another habeas
case that year, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), to conclude that Congress had not
eliminated the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain aliens' legal claims
through a recent statutory change. Id. at 300. The majority engaged in what Professors
Fallon and Meltzer called a "disingenuous" and "tortured" reading of the relevant statute
to avoid the potential Suspension Clause problems that a more straightforward reading
might have raised. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 151, at 2050.
291. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 ("[E]ven if it were possible, as a textual matter, to
read into the [DTA] each of the necessary procedures we have identified, we could not
overlook the cumulative effect of our doing so.").
292. Id. at 2292.
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would be unconstitutional. 293 The Boumediene majority, therefore, inter-
preted the MCA in a manner largely consistent with Congress' intent, as
this article has described it, by striking down Section 7 altogether. In-
deed, the majority did what some critics of the Ashwander canon have
argued is preferable: strike down the statute outright rather than re-write
it to make it constitutional. 294
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion, in contrast to the majority's, is notable
for its desire to use Ashwander aggressively to interpret the DTA to sus-
tain the MCA. In particular, Chief Justice Roberts focused on the DTA's
catchall clause, which authorized the D.C. Circuit to decide on review
whether CSRT proceedings were "consistent with 'the Constitution and
laws of the United States." 295 Reading the catchall clause in conjunction
with a strong application of Ashwander, as urged by Solicitor General
Paul Clement at oral argument,296 Chief Justice Roberts would have read
the DTA to "permit the D.C. Circuit to remand a detainee's case for a
new CSRT determination" in light of exculpatory evidence discovered af-
ter a detainee's initial CSRT.297 Unlike Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice
Roberts read the DTA as authorizing the D.C. Circuit to review a poten-
tial declination by the military to convene a new CSRT should the de-
tainee obtain new evidence. 298 Chief Justice Roberts also invoked the
Ashwander canon in support of his aggressive reading of the DTA to per-
mit the D.C. Circuit to order the release of detainees, despite the statute's
silence on the subject.299
Throughout his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts ignored Congress' un-
constitutional intent in passing the MCA. Unlike the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts viewed Congress' work as worthy of being salvaged,
referring to the political branches' "good faith" in designing the CSRT-
DTA detention review scheme,300 as well as their justifiable (in his opin-
ion) reliance on the Court's decision in Hamdi to fashion a constitutional
mechanism for contesting detention.301 In failing to recognize the MCA's
293. Of course, many other members of the enacting majority in both the House and
Senate publicly argued for the MCA's constitutionality. See supra notes 230 and 254.
294. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
295. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2280 (citing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2742).
296. Id. at 2272 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, 53, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.
2229) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
297. Id. at 2289.
298. Id. at 2290 n.2.
299. Id. at 2291 ("As the Court basically admits, the DTA can be read to permit the
D.C. Circuit to order release in light of our traditional principles of construing statutes to
avoid difficult constitutional issues .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 2291 ("To avoid constitu-
tional infirmity, it is reasonable to imply more [into the DTA than just some sort of reme-
dial authority vested in the D.C. Circuit].") (citing Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis,
J., concurring)); id. at 2292 (urging reading of DTA that "avoids serious constitutional
difficulty").
300. Id. at 2285; see also id. at 2284 (describing Congress' attempt to provide the ac-
cused alien combatants at Guantgnamo a constitutionally adequate chance to contest their
detentions as "considered").
301. Id. at 2285 (asserting that Congress followed Hamdi in establishing CSRT-DTA
system, "only to find itself the victim of a constitutional bait and switch").
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tainted legislative history, Chief Justice Roberts' dissent is arguably no
more judicially modest than the majority opinion, since he would have
aggressively construed the DTA to uphold the MCA. 30 2 Both Justice
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts were willing to "clean up" the MCA:
the majority preferred a comprehensive job-outright invalidation-to
the dissent's Ashwander transmogrification. Which approach is more def-
erential to Congress is debatable, but the majority opinion was not the
only one guilty of "judicial supremacy," as Justice Scalia charged in his
dissent, and it was not wholly inconsistent with Congress' intent.30 3
While the Boumediene majority may have decided the case in a manner
consistent with legislative intent, it nonetheless let Congress off the hook
for its intentionally unconstitutional law.30 4 The Boumediene decision
may, therefore, only increase the incentive for members of Congress to
vote for intentionally unconstitutional legislation in the future. To be fair,
the Court was not faced with very good options. If it upheld the law, it
would have contravened Congress' intent and validated a law that a ma-
jority of the Court, using its own interpretive tools, viewed as deeply
flawed. If it either struck down the law, as it did, or followed Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and aggressively interpreted the DTA to sustain the MCA, it
risked fostering further congressional dependence on judicial review.
Perhaps there was a way, however, for the Court to have assuaged these
competing concerns. The Court might have struck down the MCA and
remanded the issue to Congress for reconsideration, with a more direct
reminder to Congress of its obligation to uphold the Constitution than
that which was offered by the Boumediene majority.30 5 In doing so, the
Court could have held the restoration of habeas in abeyance for a limited
amount of time-say, 90 to 120 days-while Congress and the President
crafted a new scheme that each believed to be constitutional.
Although formally unprecedented, a judicial "remand" on the basis of
Congress' unconstitutional intent is not without support in the Constitu-
tion's text. As explained above, the constitutional structure envisions a
role for Congress to play in interpreting the Constitution. Congress pass-
ing a law that it publicly acknowledges to be unconstitutional is a breach
of Congress' proper role under the Constitution's lawmaking structure in
a manner similar to a law that violates the presentment or bicameralism
requirements. 30 6 The Constitution's text specifically states that members
of Congress are "bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this constitu-
tion, '30 7 just as it requires that bills be passed by two houses and
302. See Schauer, supra note 11, at 81.
303. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. Of course, Chief Justice Roberts' approach, through its aggressive statutory inter-
pretation, also lets Congress off the hook in its own way.
305. Supra text accompanying note 288.
306. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Paulsen, supra note 23, at 2722 (reading Marbury as "an
argument for the personal constitutional responsibility of all who swear an oath to support
the Constitution," including members of Congress).
307. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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presented to the President for his signature.30 8 Although a full explora-
tion of the justiciability of violations of the Congressional Oath of Office
Clause is beyond the purview of this article, the Clause provides at least
one textual source upon which the Court might have relied for invalidat-
ing the MCA's Section 7 on the basis of its intentionally unconstitutional
nature alone. 30 9 As a general matter, it would be impractical and unde-
sirable to require every member of Congress who votes for a law to cer-
tify in the congressional record, or testify before a court, that he
believes-or believed at the time he voted-that the law's every provi-
sion is constitutional. In the case of the MCA, however, there were clear
indicia of Congress' unconstitutional intent in the form of member state-
ments and the voting patterns described above. 310 Further, while giving
Congress a choice to legislate or face the restoration of habeas might
raise separation-of-powers concerns, similar remedies are not unprece-
dented in state constitutional adjudication, where state supreme courts
have often issued decisions allowing the legislature to establish a reme-
dial scheme within a certain time frame. 311 Aside from the proposed
time frame, the idea that the Court can establish a default constitutional
rule that Congress may replace with an alternative scheme is unremark-
able, common to habeas itself as well other constitutional rights.3
12
The Court's actual decision in Boumediene differs from the above pro-
posal by restoring habeas immediately as a constitutional matter. It,
therefore, does not "force democracy," but at least purports to leave
room for the political branches to craft an "adequate substitute" for
habeas in the future. 313 At the same time, nothing in Boumediene pro-
hibits Congress from attempting to formally suspend habeas at Guantd-
namo in the near future, although it seems unlikely that the current
Congress, now under Democratic control, would pursue such an option,
as congressional Democratic leaders generally praised the Boumediene
308. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247
(1997) ("A Senator . . . would violate her oath of office by acting against the
Constitution.").
309. There is some scholarship exploring the justiciability of questions involving the
Presidential, rather than Congressional, Oath of Office Clause. See, e.g., Peter Raven-
Hansen & William G. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chiefs
Spending Power, 81 IowA L. REV. 79, 122 (1995).
310. See supra section III.B.
311. E.g., Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 463 (2006) (requiring state to either amend
marriage statute to include same-sex couples or create "parallel statutory scheme" provid-
ing same rights and benefits within 180 days); Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 224-26 (1999)
(ruling that state legislature must provide same-sex couples with "same benefits and pro-
tections" offered to opposite-sex couples, but giving legislature "reasonable period of
time" to "craft an appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate").
312. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (leaving open prospect that
Congress or the states might devise an alternative scheme for protecting the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination besides the Miranda warning).
313. Id. at 2277 ("The political branches, consistent with their independent obligations
to interpret and uphold the Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to
preserve constitutional values while protecting the Nation from terrorism.").
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decision. 314 Indeed, as a politically savvy institution, the Court likely felt
more comfortable ruling in favor of the Boumediene petitioners knowing
that the political winds had shifted significantly since the MCA was
passed in the waning days of the Republican-controlled Congress.315
Democrats won a decisive victory in the November 2006 midterm elec-
tions,316 and President Bush's public approval ratings have continued to
fall since then to record low levels.317 Further, after taking control of
Congress, Democrats attempted to restore habeas rights to detainees
while the Boumediene litigation was proceeding. Although their attempt
was stymied by a Republican filibuster in the Senate, the proposal to re-
store habeas to detainees at Guantinamo succeeded in attracting majori-
ties in both houses of Congress. 318 The Court decided Boumediene,
therefore, in the context of a politically weakened executive and a Con-
gress whose leadership was likely to support the decision, even if it was
incapable of repealing Section 7 of the MCA itself.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to interpret Boumediene as embodying a fundamental
shift in how the executive is restrained during wartime, from a tripartite
system in which Congress helps to constrain the president, as articulated
by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case and re-affirmed in Hamdan, to
a pas de deux in which Congress sits idly by during-or even approves
through legislation-the aggrandizement of executive power and counts
on the courts to act alone in restraining the president. It is probably too
314. Daniel W. Reilly, Democrats Seize On Supreme Court Gitmo Ruling, CBS NEWS,
June 12, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/06/12/politics/politico/thecrypt/main4
175909.shtml. Since Boumediene, the Bush administration-through Attorney General
Michael Mukasey-has pressed Congress to blunt the ruling's impact by passing legislation
that would, among other things, prevent detainees from being released into the United
States, streamline post-Boumediene habeas proceedings, and "reaffirm" (in the administra-
tion's opinion) the government's authority to detain enemy combatants for the duration of
the conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated organizations. See Michael B.
Mukasey, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech Before the American Enterprise Institute (July 21,
2008), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/ag-speech-
at-aei-july-21-2008.doc. Democratic congressional leaders reacted coolly to Attorney Gen-
eral Mukasey's proposals. See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Democratic Communications
Center, Reid Statement on Attorney General Mukasey's Remarks on 9/11 Detainees (July
21, 2008), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/sen-reid-
on-mukasey-7-21-08.doc ("It is hard to imagine that Congress can give this complex issue
the attention it deserves in the closing weeks of this legislative session.").
315. Michael Greenberger, You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet: The Inevitable Post-Hamdan
Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805, 830-31
(2007).
316. Id. at 830.
317. E.g., Paul Steinhauser, Poll: More Disapprove of Bush than Any Other President,
CNN NEWS, May 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/01/bush.poll/. It is
worth noting that while President Bush's approval ratings have sunk to record lows, Con-
gress' approval ratings also continued to fall to record-low levels even after the Democratic
takeover. Poll: Bush Approval Lower than Ever; Congress Matches All-Time Low,
FoxNEws, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,329817,00.html.
318. Carl Hulse, Senate Blocks Appeals Options for Detainees, INr'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 21, 2007, at 4.
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soon to declare Steel Seizure dead, however, given that Boumediene in-
volved a unique set of facts and issues and was decided by a single vote
on a sharply divided Court. That Boumediene concerned increased exec-
utive power vis-a-vis the judiciary, rather than simply vis-A-vis Congress
(the more common context in which Steel Seizure applies), may limit its
reach in other separation-of-powers cases. 319 Also, the Boumediene
Court showed itself to be a particularly jealous guardian of the writ of
habeas corpus, seeming to value preserving the writ because of its intrin-
sic, and perhaps even symbolic, rather than merely functional, value.320
Finally, the Boumediene petitioners were particularly sympathetic plain-
tiffs-and candidates for habeas relief-because they had been held for a
long period of time (some up to six years) without any guarantee of a trial
in the near future, which clearly disturbed the majority.321
Nonetheless, the passage of the MCA demonstrates that Congress does
not always intend for the laws it passes to survive judicial review intact,
and sometimes relies on judicial review to "clean up" legislation it dis-
likes. Boumediene does nothing to change this dynamic, as the Court
"cleaned up" the MCA's Section 7 by invalidating it. Boumediene is only
likely to increase the possibility of Congress passing intentionally uncon-
stitutional legislation in the future. Further, the Court's decision is un-
likely to spur Congress to take a more forceful stand on other matters of
constitutional importance about which it has also been particularly timid
in challenging the executive in recent years, such as Iraq war funding,322
warrantless wiretapping, 323 and the enforcement of congressional subpoe-
nas against former and current executive branch officials. 32 4 Unless and
319. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 231.
320. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2292 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for "mak[ing] no effort to elaborate how exactly" habeas "differ[s] from the pro-
cedural protections detainees enjoy under the DTA").
321. Id. at 2263 ("[Tlhe fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access to
a judicial forum for a period of years render[s] these cases exceptional.").
322. The Democratic Congress has repeatedly failed in its attempts to use Congress'
spending power to bring an end to the Iraq war. See Carl Hulse, House Leaders Reach
Deal on Top Spending Measure, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at A19; David M. Herszenhorn
& Carl Hulse, Effort to Shift Course in Iraq Fails in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at
Al; Carl Hulse, Democrats Pull Troop Deadline from Iraq Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007,
at Al.
323. Despite initially raising vehement objections to the Bush administration's warrant-
less wiretapping program, the Democratic Congress recently passed legislation that ampli-
fies executive power over electronic surveillance and gives immunity from lawsuits to the
telecommunications companies that cooperated with President Bush's program. See Shai-
lagh Murray, Obama Joins Fellow Senators in Passing New Wiretapping Measure, WASH.
POST, July 10, 2008, at A6.
324. Former aides of President Bush, such as Joshua Bolten, Harriet Miers, and Karl
Rove have ignored subpoenas to testify before Congress, claiming executive privilege. See
Susan Crabtree, Court Hears Arguments in Executive Privilege Case Involving Bolten,
Miers, THE HILL, June 23, 2007, at 6. Rove Ignores Committee's Subpoenas, Refuses to
Testify, CNN NEws, July 10, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/10/
rove.subpoena/index.html. Rather than use some of the more direct tools available to
Congress to enforce the subpoenas, such as cutting off funding to executive departments or
even jailing witnesses for contempt of Congress, Crabtree, supra; Adam Cohen, Congress
Has a Way of Making Witnesses Speak: Its Own Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A34, the
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until voters begin to care more about whether members of Congress take
seriously their obligation to support and defend the Constitution, mem-
bers of Congress likely face little political risk in voting for legislation
that they also proclaim to be unconstitutional.
Democratic-controlled Congress has taken the more tepid route of suing in federal court to
enforce the subpoenas. Crabtree, supra.
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